

《English》

Strengthening Resilience Through a Whole-Nation Approach

「挙国一致のアプローチを通じたレジリエンスの強化」

ADM Tomohisa Takei

Adviser, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies (JFSS)

32nd Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)

武居 智久

日本戦略研究フォーラム（JFSS）顧問

第32代海上幕僚長

Thank you for having me. I am very honored to have this opportunity to speak at the dialogue. I would like to discuss: it is important for democracies to strengthen resilience through a whole-of-nation approach.

- Based on the lessons of the war in Ukraine, let me **first** highlight **two changes in the strategic environment** that require democracies to become more resilient. They are (1) the increasing complexity of the global structure and (2) the destabilizing nuclear power balance.
- **As for the first change**, the global structure has become **tripolar and more fragmented**, and it is no longer possible to organize it simply in terms of democratic-authoritarian rivalries or great power competition. The war in Ukraine has clearly shown that, in addition to authoritarians and democracies, there are countries that do not want to belong to either group.
- We saw it in the UN General Assembly resolutions on the war in Ukraine.

The United Nations has three functions to stop wars. They are the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice and the General Assembly. The UN Security Council failed to stop the war because of Russia's **veto**, and Russia ignored the order of the International Court of Justice.

- Seeing that the Security Council was not functioning, the United Nations held an emergency special session on March 2, 2022, where a majority of 141 countries **voted in favor** on a "resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine by Russia," while 5 countries opposed and 35 abstained.
- The outcome of this vote is **extremely important**.
- This is because 35 countries, or about 18%, took a **neutral stance** on the resolution, which means that even in the case of a clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a UN member state, there would be a certain number of countries that would not oppose it.
- At the UN emergency special session on April 7, a resolution was passed to **suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Commission** with 48% of the countries voted in favor of the resolution.
- In other words, more than 50% of countries did not give their approval. This number also has an important meaning for democracies. Because, the UN cannot act in unison even on values that are critical to democracy, such as human rights.
- This means that when something happens, for both democracies and authoritarians, those who **incorporate** more of the third group will be able to justify their actions.
- Chinese-Russian approach to the third group, as well as their diplomatic response to the Hamas terror in last October can be explained in the same context.
- Moreover, the use of Hamas by China and Russia to expand their influence could fragment an already polarized world structure.
- It was predictable that the UN Security Council could not act unanimously to deal with Hamas terror.
- What complicated the situation was that some countries that voted for the

resolution condemning Russia voted against the resolution condemning Hamas.

- This situation indicates that the global structure tri-polarized by the War in Ukraine is further fragmented by the terror of Hamas.
- The protracted war in Ukraine has also brought about two changes in the strategic structure of Europe. They are “enlargement” and “division”. Countries like Finland, which perceived Russian authoritarianism as a threat, joined NATO, while countries like Hungary, which saw economic benefits in good relations with Russia, disrupted the unity of the EU and moved closer to Russia.
- What we have learned from NATO is that even in decades-long alliances, **weak links** become targets for status quo changers.
- In the fragmented global structure, once the regional order is destabilized, it is not easy to recover. The reasons are, **first**, that the influence of the major powers has declined and there are no longer **any dominant powers**.
- **Second**, the war prevention function of the UN Security Council has been paralyzed. And **third**, countries, including democracies, often **come together** and **break apart** according to their national interests, so that the UN's war prevention function doesn't work sufficiently.
- We must ask ourselves **how to adapt** our security posture to the emerging global structure, and **how to make** the solidarity of democracies more resilient in the fluidized strategic environment.
- **The second reason that democracies need resilience** is the **destabilization** of the strategic nuclear power balance, which has shaken the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence to democracies.
- The democracies face **four allied authoritarian countries** at the same time - Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Three of the four are in East Asia and nuclear powers. Although China is now a near-peer competitor with the United States in nuclear weapons, in ten years it will be a peer competitor in both nuclear and conventional power.

- Regarding the war in Ukraine, it is said that one of the reasons why the situation has not improved despite Ukraine's desperate struggle is that the U.S. government is prioritizing **preventing** the war **from** escalating into an exchange of nuclear weapons and becoming World War III, **instead of** prioritizing victory for Ukraine.
- It is generally believed that the Biden administration was **deterred** by Russia's nuclear intimidation at the outbreak of the war.
- If China becomes a **peer competitor** of the U.S. in nuclear weapons in the coming years, it will **cast a shadow** over the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to the Asian democracies.
- We must accept **the fact** that the **presence** of the United States is relatively declining. This must be our point of view in thinking about national security of coming years.

- Based on this, **first**, we need to strengthen the national resilience of our countries as a whole to cope with the new strategic environment, **so as not to become** a weak link in the democratic countries, while firmly strengthening the unity of allies, friends and like-minded countries.

- And **second**, we need to think about **what we didn't have to think about** in the past strategic environment and **what was unthinkable** in the past nuclear balance.
- For Japan and Taiwan, it must be the Taiwan contingency in the emerging new strategic environment.

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