Anglo-Japanese Relations Column Vol.1
The Way of Maritime States

JFSS Research Fellow KAZUNORI Hashimoto

Introduction

In September 2021, the United Kingdom Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21) visited Yokosuka, Japan, led by HMS Queen Elizabeth, the British cutting-edge aircraft carrier. During the deployment in the Indo-Pacific, the CGS21 participated in the US-Japan-Euro joint exercise in the Ocean. The joint exercise and HMS Queen Elizabeth’s visit to Japan showed that the two nations now have the closest relationship in decades. Such an amicable friendship between the two is probably seen for the first time since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This essay will explore from historical and geopolitical perspectives how the Anglo-Japanese relation went through amicable and difficult times and how it will develop in the future.

 

The British Empire as a Maritime State 

In the 18th and 19th Centuries, the British Empire, often described as ‘the empire on which the sun never sets’, reached new heights of prosperity by trade across the seven seas. Needless to say, the prosperity was sustained by the Empire’s great naval power, which made it possible for the British Empire to uphold for long the isolationist policy called the ‘Splendid Isolation’. Thus, it was a great surprise to the world that the great power chose Japan, a rising but still small island country in the Far East, as its ally in 1902. Geopolitics can explain the reason for the alliance well, giving a simple view of the world where states compete against each other with their geographical characteristics. Such characteristics can roughly be categorised into two: maritime states and continental states. Good examples of the former are Britain and Japan, whereas the latter are Russia, Germany and China. 

　The reason why the world’s greatest maritime power made an alliance with the rising maritime state in the Far East was quite simple – to contain its rival, Russia, the great land power state. Seeking non-frozen seas to the South, at that time, Russia competed heavily for the hegemony of Central Asia against Britain that held the regions from the Middle East to India. Turkey and Japan were also annoyed by Russia’s southbound invasion. Japan, in particular, was the rising regional maritime power, and her navy was established with the help of Britain. Thus, it was not only the mutual interests but also their compatibility as maritime states that brought together Britain and Japan. Of course, there is no need to mention here the success of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

　However, the good days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ended in 1921 when the Washington Conference was held (although the official abrogation of the Alliance was in 1923). Not a few British officials were discontent with the abrogation brought about by the American pressure, and such officials continued to have hope for the revival of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In 1928, the British Government investigated and studied the revival. Moreover, in 1934, inside the British Government, the movement to seek the ‘Anglo-Japanese neutral pact’ became active, led by Chancellor Nevil Chamberlain, who advocated in the Cabinet meeting on 14 March 1934 that the cooperation with Japan in the Far East would be beneficial to stabilise the Empire’s defence. Alongside Chamberlain, Morris Hankey, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, proactively called for cooperation with Japan. Notably, Chamberlain was the leader of the ‘finance school’, and Hankey was the leader of the ‘Empire school’. Although Britain had a gigantic navy to sustain the Empire, such a navy cost enormously. The ‘finance school’ wished to disarm the Navy because of the long-lasting effect of the Great Depression, whereas the ‘Empire school’ wanted to maintain the Empire’s defence system. Here they came to the same conclusion that cooperating with Japan would be a good option to accomplish their objectives. Furthermore, the British were to hold the Second London Conference the following year. 

　In the 1930s, however, the international environments were totally different from those of 1902. The US took over the world hegemony from Britain and craved to take part in the Chinese market. Japan started to run Manchukuo, acting as if she were a land power state, and got close to Germany. The Soviet Union, founded in 1922, was not as great a threat to Britain as Czarist Russia was, whereas Japan and Britain began to confront each other over the interests in China. In short, at that time, both Japan and Britain seem to have lost their parts as maritime trade states. Ultimately, such a situation led to the Second World War, and as a result, the Japanese Empire disappeared, and the British Empire was dissolved. A maritime state cannot live without free and open seas that ensure free trade and thus prosperity. A navy is a force to protect free trade and prosperity. It was implicative that Britain’s ‘Empire School’ sought an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement and cooperation even in the 1930s. 

 

From the lost Empire to Global Britain

The Cold War can be seen as a competition between the Sea Power (the US) and the Land Power (the Soviet). As the allies of the US, Japan and Britain belonged to the camp of maritime states and thus could enjoy prosperity. However, things changed after the Cold War ended. Restricted with her Constitution, Japan had no intention or capability to play a role as a maritime power in the West Pacific after the Cold War. On the other hand, Britain, as an EU member state, came under the influence of continental Europe. Traditionally, the British foreign policy was supported by three pillars – the ties with the US, Europe and the Commonwealth (the old Empire). During the Cold War, the relation with the US was undoubtedly most important. After the Cold War, the relation with Europe became more beneficial than ever, but the EU membership meant that Britain was now restricted by the EU regulations and laws. In other words, the benefit from continental Europe deprived Britain of opportunities to trade freely on her own. Notably, it was Germany and France, continental states, that took the lead in the EU. Effectively, Britain became incorporated into the European Continent, losing sight of her maritime characteristics.

　In 2016, the British people chose to leave the EU. Contrary to the referendum result, many scholars and intellectuals denounced Brexit as bringing a huge economic loss to Britain. From a geopolitical perspective, however, Brexit was an inevitable conclusion. The British people are a freedom-loving nation, much more than they are thought to be. It is presumably because of their characteristics as a maritime nation. Thus, it is no wonder that the British became tired of the EU regulations and laws, the control from the Continent. 

The way the British should choose after the Brexit is clearly visible – to sail the sea and trade globally. Indeed, the British Government has upheld the slogan ‘Global Britain’. Fortunately, Britain still has the heritage of the Empire as the Commonwealth and thus has a good opportunity to regain her position as a global trading nation by strengthening the bonds with the Commonwealth countries. Conveniently, some of them are already the member states of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), for the membership of which, the British Government started negotiations in June 2021. 

　The previous month, Britain sent out the Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific. Queen Elizabeth and Prime Minister Johnson visited the HMS Queen Elizabeth, the flagship of the CSG, and encouraged the crew before the long journey. The British media reported the CSG’s mission to the Indo-Pacific with a headline “Britain’s first step to return to the global stage.” Here Britain showed her resolution to become a global player again. In the Indo-Pacific, the HMS Queen Elizabeth not only visited countries that used to have close ties with the British Empire, such as Singapore and Japan, but also sailed the South China Sea and joined the joint exercise with navies from Japan, the US, and the Netherlands. The signal to China was clear. In order to check China’s ambition in the region, Britain dispatched the CSG, which was formed for the first time in a decade, all the way to the Indo-Pacific. Britain’s effort was based on her global strategy. It is described in detail in the British Government’s policy paper ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’, published in March 2021.

　The policy paper states that “The Indo-Pacific region matters to the UK: it is critical to our economy, our security and our global ambition to support open societies.”¹ Moreover, it explains the background of the statement as follows: 

 

Much of the UK’s trade with Asia depends on shipping that goes through a range of Indo-Pacific choke points. Preserving freedom of navigation is therefore essential to the UK’s national interests. We already work closely with regional partners and will do more through persistent engagement by our armed forces and our wider security capacity-building.²

 

Notably, Britain shows her determination not to hesitate to use force when necessary in order to protect free trade and international rules: free trade needs stability in the international society, and international rules are a prerequisite for stability. Thus, the deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth and the CGS to the Indo-Pacific implies that Britain recognises the existence of a threat that does not respect international rules in the region. 

 

The way Japan should take

Britain has regained their consciousness as a maritime trading state. At the same time, Japan upholds the slogan of ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ and has been closely cooperating with the US, India, and Australia. Miraculously, Japan and Britain now stand on the same ground again a hundred years after the 1921 Washington Conference, when the two nations parted ways. Japan’s way to proceed emerges with lucidity as she recognises who is the menace to the freedom of the sea. The maritime state’s way to prosperity is incompatible with a continental state’s autocratic way. 

 

 

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1 Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (HM Government, March 2021), p.66. 

2  Ibid.