Military Assessment of “New Cold War”
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Member of Policy Proposal Committee／ Former Commander of Air Materiel Command, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Sadamasa Oue
Introduction
We are now seeing ongoing pandemic of the COVID-19 all over the world and can't predict when its end will be declared. It is quite early and difficult to assess the extensive consequences as well as the situation of the human society in the post-pandemic world. Meanwhile, the novel corona virus crisis has highlighted both a state of unsettlement of the U.S.-led liberal international order, which Japan has largely depended upon for the prosperity and peace after the World War II, and the fragility of Japan's postwar society, accelerating the changing speed of current situation.
Undoubtedly, it is the relation between the U.S. and China called “the New Cold War” that is centered in the unstable world. The Republican Party and the Democratic Party are competing regarding the severer policy against China towards the coming U.S. presidential election in the next November while China, with stronger self-confidence after its coronavirus containment and economic recovery, is aiming to spread China's measures through foreign policies such as “mask diplomacy” for the countries struggling to deal with the pandemic. Therefore, for the forecast of the world security after the coronavirus, it would be beneficial and necessary to discuss and consider the present U.S.-China relationship, as a rapid compromise could not be reached between these two great-powers.
The year of 2020, for Japan, should have been a momentous year, when 2020 Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics would have been held, marking the 75th anniversary of the end of WWII and the 60th of the amended Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, but plans for the celebratory events were ruled out due to the pandemic. Rather, Japan has come to face many problems inherent in the society. Apparently, various problems, which we have been leaving and hidden with long-time neglect, indifference and laziness, have broken out in many factors, for example, a crisis management system of the government, health and hygiene, medical care, digital infrastructure, supply chains and cyber security. The new Prime Minister has been assumed quite heavy duties and responsibilities for guiding Japan after Shinzo Abe's sudden announcement of his resignation. Especially, in order for Japan to survive and thrive in the even tougher security environment after the pandemic, we are required to achieve the conversion of the national regime in conformity to the changing environment on the basis of the comprehension of the U.S.- China “New Cold War.”
In this article, it will be analyzed that the military aspects of confrontation between the two great powers, the U.S. and China, which underlies the examination of the future security and defense alignments of Japan considering consequences of the pandemic.
1. Facts in new “Cold War” and Core of Conflict
○Facts in new “Cold War” and Differences from old “Cold War”
An American political scientist Graham Allison of Harvard University introduces the concept of “Thucydides Trap” as a historical lesson which the war frequently occurs when the emerging powers challenge the existing hegemonic powers, and pointed out that the U.S. and China would fall into the trap with over 50% possibilities. Furthermore, he believes that, for the avoiding of the trap, the U.S. needs to adopt the basic strategy to maintain the balance of power between China with redefinition of its significant national interests and revision of the defense obligations. Similarly, the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations published six articles on its journal of the March/April 2020 issue of Foreign Affairs featuring “Come Home, America?,” in five of which it supposed to the U.S. government revision of the roles in international affairs and even considering to decrease military commitments as G. Allison suggested.
Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, in his article written in The Wall Street Journal on August 24, 2020, concluded that “We have entered a new era of global competition between the free and open international order and an authoritarian system fostered by Beijing,” and (China aims to) “reshape the international order in ways that undermine globally accepted rules while normalizing authoritarianism, creating conditions to allow the Chinese Communist Party to coerce other countries and impede their sovereignty1.” Also, he wrote that “First and foremost, long-term competition with China demands that we have a force that is able to compete, deter and win across all domains: air, land, sea, space and cyberspace2,” and then stressed the basic policy of the national defense strategy, which means that even ‘to keep the capability to win war' is the best way to avoid battles.
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought about self-assertive and oppressive actions of China and has disclosed to the international society both dissimilarity of the communist party rule and risks of totalitarian regime. It symbolizes these abnormalities of China that the government and private institutions from eight countries including the U.S. filed lawsuits against the Chinese government to pay compensation, saying that China's faults of initial response to the COVID-19 mainly had caused this pandemic. The Pew Research Center, an American think tank providing information on public opinion, conducted a survey on July 30, which showed Americans' unfavorable views toward China reached historically high level, 73% of American adults bear unfavorable feelings to the country. The survey also revealed that 26% of people see China as an enemy of the U.S. and 57% describe it as a competitor, up 11% and down 9% since 2012 respectively. 78% of American put the great blame for the spread of the COVID-19 on the Chinese government and 77% have little faith in the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping while 50% have no faith.
Conversely, China Central Television (CCTV), a Chinese public service broadcaster, sharply criticized Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, by calling his name as the “common enemy of mankind” while the Global Times, a Chinese newspaper under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), also cited an article mentioned threatening message that “we will make the U.S. feel pain in some area that they can never imagine.”
Liu Cixin, a Chinese author of the science fiction novel “The Three-Body Problem (三体),” in an interview with The Asahi Shimbun, a national newspaper in Japan, told that many Chinese people once had had favorable feelings to the Western society, but they have noticed it was a fantasy that, knowing their present criticisms towards China, we can expect to achieve the development in cooperation with the West, and instead they will continue to regard us as an opponent. He also pointed out that Chinese public's negative views toward the West have turned worst in the pandemic. Considering the above circumstances, the U.S.-China relationship, which was competition that is aiming to supremacy over opponents in the trade and technology, has turned to mutual and exclusive confrontation generated from differences of political regime and code of conduct, and then will highly likely become conflict to remove or to beat oppositions because of growing emotional confrontation of each other.
The deteriorated U.S.-China relationship is compared to “Cold War” between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the Pompeo's statement on July 23 is also interpreted as the identifying both its opponents. However, it would be incorrect, rather harmful, to regard the current U.S.-China relationship as the situation of the “Cold War,” in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union had no economic relations and the direct military warfare between the two superpowers were deterred by the mutual assured destruction of nuclear weapons whereas there existed the global ideological confrontation. Although there occurred the proxy wars between the two superpowers in various regions in the world, the Cold War structure itself was stable because of mechanisms for the arms control and disarmament for the prevention of the “Hot War” between them.
Unlike with the Soviet Union, the U.S. has an economic interdependence with China, as well as an asymmetric military power balance with stronger nuclear and conventional forces. Meanwhile, China is deploying the global campaign for the higher position and influence suitable to its power, but it has regarded as its core interests, at most, the defense and recovery of the sovereignty that China claims, targeting the Indo-Pacific region, not the mainland of the U.S. or the ideological confrontation. Conversely, conflicts regarding Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, territories in the South China Sea, have the possibility of U.S.-China war while they have not established any structure or framework such as arms control.
It is completely unclear to predict how the U.S.-China competition will settle in the stable structure. In other words, it can be said that the world faces a crossroads which may lead to warfare either in cold or hot, depending upon future actions of the related countries including Japan. Therefore, we have to understand the substance of complicated competition between the U.S. and China.
○Rivalry concerning Orders and Power
Abraham Denmark, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, in his recent book titled U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century, argues that the essence of the competition between the U.S. and China is one concerning orders and power, pointing out that there would be gaps of views against each other because Washington concludes that China is going to challenge the post-world war order while Beijing assumes that the U.S. is going to interrupt its development.
Powers such as economy, military and authority determine the way orders are, and the U.S. powers have been maintaining the free and open international order so far. China, which upheld “Reform and Opening-up policy” led by Deng Xiaoping, succeeded in the achievement of high economic growth and superpower through joining the order. In turn, utilizing the superpower, China is trying to change the current international order and the international organizations favorable for it, in addition to applying a double standard self-assertively to reject arbitrarily or impose the rule of law. Moreover, Chinese President Xi Jinping is trying to actualize both the internationalization of totalitarian surveillance societies under the CCP and the tributary system controlled by China, which means the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
The U.S. is in the difficulty of bearing burden to maintain the international order as its powers has been weakened by various factors. As Robert Spalding described in detail in his book Stealth War, it is the fact that the powers of the U.S. has been undermined by China's infringements of intellectual property rights and cyber-attacks as well as continuous American wars since 9.11 attacks and the financial crisis since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. President Donald Trump's “America First” policy would be a right goal in current circumstances where the U.S. has to assign the highest priority to regain its superpower.
Regardless of the international orders led by the U.S., he has misused his rights to make policies, such as withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and the unilateral force reduction which could dismantle trusted relationships with its alliances. Additionally, based on obscure criteria of security concern to the U.S., we have witnessed prohibition of transaction with Chinese companies and cancellation of students' visas from the country.
While every country has no choice but to close its border to safeguard nation's life and livelihood, it needs to keep the international cooperation for countermeasures against the pandemic and prevention of protectionism. A country can make its power stronger by determining the favorable order and standards in international systems in the international regime, which has not been established yet in the fields of digital information protection and military use of emerging technologies. The Trump administration needs to struggle to change the comprehension of power strengthening.
Rivalries and competitions between the U.S. and China have been witnessed in many fields, including diplomacy, intelligence, military, economy and technology. The future U.S.-China relationship and thus the way of the liberal international order being will be set by total optimization of each policy in mutually related factors and supremacy over the opponent. In particular, as military is the most significant factor in security, analysis on the relations of two powers needs to be focused on military balance, considering the possibility for economic and technological powers to be converted to military power.
○Adjustment between Core Interests and Vital National Interests
A state exerts the power to secure its national interests. As the state secures the interests directly linked to its survival and identity, even by military measures, the possibility of military warfare depends on whether national interests can be shared (alliance) or conflicting (confrontation).
‘The National Security Law' of the People's Republic of China, which was issued in 2015, stipulates that China's core interests are “the regime, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, welfare of the people and sustainable economic and social development.” Although detailed meanings of them are still not described in the law, regarding the sovereignty, Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang are considered as core interests while disputes in the South and East China Sea are also included in such interests as China expands the presence there.
Incidentally, regarding the Senkaku Islands, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying, then Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry Information Department, at a press conference held on April 26, 2013, stated that “China's Peaceful Development, the white paper released by China's State Council Information Office in September 2011, made it clear that China firmly secures its core national interests, including national sovereignty, national security and territorial integrity. The Diaoyu Islands (a Chinese name of Senkaku Islands) issue concerns China's territorial sovereignty3.” Conversely, China is extending the meaning of core interests in proportion to expanded range of its power. The main problem is whether or not the Xi administration, which is upholding ‘Chinese Dream,' can flexibly revise meanings of core interests in response to the power of the U.S. and the international orders, but the possibility remains quite low under recent affairs.
In November 2009, the White House used a phrase of “to respect and accommodate each other's core interests and major concerns4” in a joint press statement, which was released by the former U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to China. On the grounds of the joint press statement, China would continue to require the U.S. to respect core interests each other.
President Trump released ‘National Security Strategy' in December 2017, disclosing four vital national interests:
1. Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life
2. Promote American prosperity
3. Preserve peace through strength
4. Advance American influence5
In the next month, the U.S. Department of Defense announced a new National Defense Strategy aiming to protect above-mentioned vital interests with eleven defense objectives, including “Sustaining Joint Force military advantages, both globally and in key regions,” “Maintaining favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere,” “Defending allies from military aggression and bolstering partners against coercion, and fairly sharing responsibilities for common defense” and “Ensuring common domains remain open and free.”
These objectives give shape to four vital national interests, but as mentioned in this article, some of U.S. strategists are firmly arguing that Washington has to modify its national interests and to reduce the military external commitment. Considering that the U.S. has already confirmed more than 180 thousand deaths in the corona pandemic, which has devastated U.S. economy and society, it is necessary to set priorities of eleven defense objectives, to select the region where they are applied to or to transfer obligations and burden to the allies.
Not to compromise in China's demand for respecting of core interests, the U.S. needs to put the highest priority on defending its allies from military aggression, sustaining military advantages in the Indo-Pacific Region while Japan is required to take charge of “fairly sharing responsibilities for common defense.”
In the following clause, the military strategy and balance in Indo-Pacific Region of the U.S. and China will be analyzed.
2. China Military Strategy and Balance
○China Military Strategy: Winning in Local Wars and “Unrestricted Warfare”
The table below shows the comparison of military strategies and China policies, which the past administrations of the U.S. and China adopted. China exhaustively investigated US high-tech war after the US forces achieved an overwhelming victory over Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991, and then concluding that it must win local wars against the U.S. for defending its core interests, China is working toward construction of strategic structure to counter U.S. strategy (Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy) in response to changing warfare with technological progress.
The Chinese news agency Zhongguo Xinwenshe put an article on the website in July, 2013. The article entitled ‘Revealing the Six Wars China Must Fight in the Coming 50 Years,' disclosed six inevitable wars:
1. The war to unify Taiwan (2020–2025)
2. The war to recover the various islands of the South China Sea (2025–2030)
3. The war to recover southern Tibet (2035–2040)
4. The war to recover Diaoyutai and the Ryukyus (2040–2045)
5. The war to unify Outer Mongolia (2045–2050)
6. The war to recover the territory seized by Russia (2055–2060)7
According to a Japanese daily newspaper The Sankei Shimbun on November 18, 2017, a military researcher revealed “China's six wars in the near future” at a symposium of the state-dominated think tank after 19th National Congress of the CCP ended on October 24 of the year.
Ian Easton, a Senior Director in The Project 2049 Institute in the U.S., pointed out that China will have completed the preparation for invasion of Taiwan by 2020, analyzing in detail China's plans on the Taiwan Strait in his book “The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia.” In addition, he concluded, in his paper of January 2019 on five war plans of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), that the ultimate goal is to establish the preparation for Taiwan occupation with deterring, delaying or preventing the US forces from the defense operations for Taiwan.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, on May 26 of 2020, stated that China needs to deepen the preparation for armed combats and reinforce the abilities for completion of military missions because our national security is being damaged severely. Taking into consideration that many active operations and exercises of the PLA, provocations and military pressures through Chinese media on Taiwan and China-India skirmishes at the Galwan Valley around the Line of Actual Control (LAC) resulting in the deaths of both sides in the middle of this June (applicable to above-mentioned number 5 of the Six Wars), we have to recognize that the PLA has been almost equipped with abilities for, at least, number 1, 2 and 4 of the Six Wars.
China, in the studies of the Gulf War, acquired one more lesson, “Unrestricted Warfare.” It was established by a major-general and a colonel in the PLA Air Force, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui who wrote a bestseller book entitled “Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America” in February, 1999. Analyzing the Gulf War and the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, they argue that a war against the U.S. should be fought by all asymmetric means in unmilitary operations, which means “non-military war operations” in combination of warfare in every domain such as trade, financial, new anti-terrorism, biological and psychological warfare. The details are as below:
“if the attacking side secretly collects large amounts of money without the enemy nation being aware of this at all and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets, then after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hacker detachment in the opponent's computer system in advance, while at the same time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone communications network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis. There is finally the forceful bearing down by the army, and military means are utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty.”
Although this theory is too innovative to be regarded as being written more than twenty years ago, seeing the current U.S.-China stand-off, the latter country has launched the non-military operations without the opponent being aware of the Stealth War.
Principles of “Unrestricted Warfare” are evolved into something in the Salami-Slice strategy used in the grey zone. Employing this strategy, China is, exploiting enemy's weakness and unguardedness, aiming to safeguard its core national interests by all means less than military operations, creating a fait accompli including building artificial islands with military bases in the South China Sea, and claiming the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands.
China identifies as “a successful case of Unrestricted Warfare” the hybrid warfare that Russia conducted in the 2014 Crimean crisis. Therefore, as well as studying cyber-attacks, electromagnetic warfare and propaganda operations effecting warriors' mind and creating the hybrid warfare that utilizes new innovative technologies such as AI and unmanned aircrafts, Beijing is highly likely to apply “Unrestricted Warfare” to above-mentioned wars such as unifying Taiwan.
○Evaluation of China's Military Balance
It is difficult to evaluate China's military power objectively. China's assessment of its power is essential to comprehension of the future actions although many research institutions including RAND Corporation, an American think tank, are trying to analyze the balance of power between the U.S. and China.
Wang Jisi, a professor in the School of International Studies of Peking University, expressed his views in his statement of “The U.S.-China relations under the COVID-19 pandemic,” saying that ①the possibility between the two powers shifting from competition towards overall confrontation, going into “Thucydides Trap,” ②the main stream concerning the relations is that China has to face the U.S. and show off its strength without any fear while the non-main stream is the thought of “Hide our strength, bide our time (韜光養晦, Taoguangyanghui)” and ③it is no longer easy that the two nations go back to the previous relationship as they are fighting more intensely in intelligent and diplomatic warfare.
Meanwhile, Qiao Liang, known as a hawkish controversialist, told in an interview of a Hong Kong media, that ①China is prepared for Taiwan unification with force anytime as a result of over twenty-year arms buildup, ②the unification is required to calculate cost effectiveness for the optimum timing, but now is not the timing while the U.S. are badly affected by the COVID-19 and ③China, which is the largest manufacturing country in the world, is unable to make a domestic market consuming Chinese products. On the contrary to this fact, both Chinese and the world economy are still controlled in the system of a key currency of the U.S. dollar, and the U.S. forces will block our sea lanes by the collaboration with the West, not engage in direct battles with China when the Taiwan Strait sees a war. He also stated that China has to prioritize the rejuvenation.
These are unemotional analysis that are made by a strategist, but we can say that Chinese people including specialists have stronger self-confidence of power and position in the world and are getting more and more aggressive towards the U.S..
The Xi administration is being internationally criticized over response to the COVID-19, in addition to facing both domestic and international difficulties such as the Hong Kong problem, accumulated debts, economic gap and unemployment. Hannah Arendt, a German-born American political philosopher, pointed out in her great book, The Origins of Totalitarianism, the danger of policymakers' infallibility in totalitarian nations. Xi Jinping, who leads the CCP in reality and in name, will not be able to escape from the logic of infallibility easily. We have to wait and see whether he is, like Qiao Liang, concentrated to calm and long-term strategies with endurance of challenge to the regime, or he makes a bold attempt to adopt foreign policies to direct public dissatisfaction towards oppositions for the sake of the regime. Largely increasing military operations of the U.S. and China are boosting risks of accidental incidents and cases with possible escalations of some sudden events.
3. U.S. Military Strategy and Balance
○U.S. Military Strategy against China and Fragility
The Trump administration expresses the U.S. strategies mentioning “Be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable”8 in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, eying China as a threatening opponent. In one of the strategies, the U.S. called off putting bombers at the Air Force bases in Guam and already withdrew them to the mainland, but instead dispatching them to the West Pacific for air patrol on demand. Regarding the U.S. Navy, it is seeking the reinforcement of battleships with the abilities to move and turn more quickly than aircraft carrier forces, the number of which might be reduced from 11 to 9 because they are vulnerable to China's missile attacks.
The Marine Corps is also planning to reshape the forces in order to respond to maritime operations shifting from instant land operations, but simultaneously these are criticized and questioned as the presence of the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region seems to be declined.
On April 1 of 2020, Admiral Philip Davidson, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, stated in the Congress that additional military spending of $20 billion is required to deter Chinese military actions in this region, which can enhance U.S. military posture such as strengthened defense system in Guam, deployment of precision offensive weapons around the First Island Chain and dispersed military forces. Two matters of how much these policies will be reflected to ‘the Global Posture Review' under consideration and how they will contribute to the countermeasures against China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) remain unpredictable.
The U.S. respects the relationships with allies and friendly nations, saying “Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.”9 However, we witnessed President Trump's behavior with disrespecting and placing demands on the allies.
Mr. Esper, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Pompeo, the Secretary of State, delivered a joint message to South Korea in an article of the headline “South Korea Is an Ally, Not a Dependent” on The Wall Street Journal dated January 16, 202010, saying that Seoul spends no more than 30% of the cost regarding the U.S. Forces Korea. Additionally, like being linked with withdrawal and cut down of the Forces in South Korea, President Trump said on June 15, that the U.S. will pull out troops from Germany unless Berlin makes a more military payment. As mentioned, the Secretary of Defense Esper announced, on July 29, that the U.S. planned to withdraw about 12,000 troops stationed in Germany, which was raised from roughly 9,500 initially approved.
The Trump administration has focused on the rethinking of the U.S. forces in South Korea. Not until Seoul gives way on increased cost of the U.S. forces stationed in the country while the negotiation is suspended, the U.S. is likely to pull out or downscale the troops. Meanwhile, a close official of President Moon Jae-In alluded to deepening the ties with China, but this direction is totally and oddly opposite to the U.S. National Defense Strategy.
The pandemic of COVID-19, which originated in Wuhan, severely affected the U.S. Forces and exposed its weakness in some fields. First of all, human resources are vital to military power, but are also subject to infections. The strongest armed forces were compelled to limit operations and the officers and soldiers also had movement restrained due to invisible and tiny enemies. The outbreak hit four U.S. aircraft carriers, which are a centerpiece of the security in Indo-Pacific region, and the contemporary gap of the U.S. Navy presence there occurred.
The pandemic cancelled and postponed regular joint exercises and defense exchanges, and the virus brought out several problems in the U.S. society. In the aircraft carriers case, a captain who had sent an e-mail calling for necessary measures to an official agent not in charge of the chain of command, was fired by an acting Secretary of the Navy who immediately blamed him for violating rules, but the Secretary resigned, too. Furthermore, the U.S. political and military situation has been in much more difficult movements since the death of an Afro-American man during his arrest by white police officers led to racial and historical problems.
The COVID-19 has affected American military industries, especially subcontracting corporations, which have 70% of contracts with some large companies such as the Boeing Company providing vital products and services for the U.S. defense. On April 20, Ellen Lord, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, had to request the Mexican government to make manufacturers restart to produce military products for the U.S. as the subcontractors are largely located in Mexico and India.
Although the high dependence on overseas supply chains in the field of aircrafts, shipbuilding, space satellite, it is impossible to relocate all the manufacturing sites. In the long term, the huge national expenditure for measures of the COVID-19 and the recession will definitely strain the military budget. As Qiao Liang intended to achieve, the U.S. will face some large risks including cancellation of Indo-Pacific Commander's initiatives to overcome China's A2/AD strategy and shifting to call on the allies to share more stationing cost of the U.S. forces. In order to avoid the risks, it is vital for the U.S. and the allies to share common military strategic goals and to develop necessary strategic operations.
○Military Balance against China in Indo-Pacific Region
On January 19 of 2018, James Mattis, the former Secretary of Defense, said “In this time of change, our military is still strong, yet our competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare: air, land, sea, space and cyberspace, and it is continuing to erode,” “Sixteen years of war, rapid technological change, defense spending caps, and seemingly continuous continuing resolutions have created an overstretched and under-resourced military” and “the supremacy of American military is not preordained. It is incumbent upon us to field a more lethal force if our nation is to retain the ability to defend ourselves and what we stand for.”11
Christian Brose served, for a long time, as an advisor of John McCain, a late Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Brose in his book entitled ‘The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare,' insisted on the change of the U.S. forces for a future war with China, arguing that during the past decade, we have recorded nearly full military simulations in which the U.S. could lose war with China.
The Western Pacific region has the highest risk of military conflict between the U.S. and China because the region contains three factors of the China's inevitable wars: namely, Taiwan, the South China Sea and Senkaku Islands and Okinawa. Moreover, it is largely recognized that the military balance there has been shifting in favor toward China. In addition to disadvantages of the Western Pacific being afield from the U.S. mainland and the fragility of the U.S. forward deployment against China's missile threats, we need to take heed of uncertainty of the U.S. concept of military operations against China, fighting tactics in simple term.
While the Air Sea Battle, the Offshore Control and recently the Maritime Pressure Strategy have been discussed, there are several important issues: in what scenario Mr. Brose simulated the war games against China, where the U.S. lost most of operations and in consequence of his results, and how the U.S. can achieve the most appropriate force posture to implement the national security strategies and the most efficient resource allocation for this. Japan, Taiwan and ASEAN powers which are parties involved in the U.S.-China conflict in the region, must resolve these vital matters as well. For the deterrence of more self-assured China's use of military force, it is required to regain the military balance based on possible full-scale war with China, making the U.S. and allies attain the supremacy.
○Strategy and Operations against “Unrestricted Warfare”
The military roles of the Liberal countries such as the U.S. are to deter wars and to maintain orders, defeating opponents who aim to launch attacks and to destroy orders, while there is a paradox; to make enemy understand the ability of deterrence avoids wars. Therefore, the U.S. Bloc must keep the forces to win wars against China which aims to seize Taiwan, the South China Sea, Senkaku Islands and Okinawa. China, however, does not need to beat the U.S. because it could make the orders favorable for Beijing without military triumph over Washington. China has established facts to reshape the orders by using the military forces cleverly at low-intensity.
In order to counteract against these China's strategies, the U.S. should more clarify the concept of military operations for deterrent power to maintain the current order and conduct them immediately. While the U.S. forces are required constantly to keep the effective measures, by which they have already acted the Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea and other areas for maintaining the orders and operated the aircraft carrier exercises for deterrence and the bombers alert flights. Furthermore, the U.S. should arrange countermeasures to forestall China's attempt to change the status quo or to reverse it by compulsion.
Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and other staffs have proposed an effective vision for forestalling in April of 2020 at Deterrence by Detection: A Key Role for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Great Power Competition. The Deterrence by Detection (DbD) is a strategy enabling to maintain real-time situational awareness and, if necessary, to alert and publicize the situation, based on a thought that U.S. competitors would have the difficulties to launch opportunistic acts of aggression with being aware of continuous surveillance.
The report argues that “Non-stealthy unmanned ISR aircraft capable of conducting wide-area persistent surveillance missions are best suited to implementing “deterrence by detection” by the United States, its allies, and partners.”12 The analysis also requires that the U.S. forces deploy 46 unmanned aircrafts in the Western Pacific, namely, the Spratly Islands, the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, the Taiwan Strait and the Chinese coastal areas, and the allies play an important role in implementing part of a regional DbD network and operating information. As the DbD is designated only to deny changing the status quo, it is required to establish the alerting and publicizing system in response to creating a fait accompli and the enforcement measures for Status Quo Ante.
○Deescalating China's Power
To secure the existing orders, it is required to strengthen the influences other than military power and the geo-economical powers supported by economy, and to combine appropriately, as “Unrestricted Warfare” describes, all the powers to accomplish objectives. Citing a case in the South China Sea, in 2016, the arbitral tribunal that had adjudicated in a suit filed by the Philippines, made an award invalidating China's ‘nine-dash line' by which it claims the sovereignty over the South China Sea.
Although the award was the most forceful and effective measure, China ignored it as a ‘mere scrap of paper' and has still continued to take such negative actions as constructing the military facilities, establishing new districts and stationing bombers. The sustainable and viable rule of law needs legal binding power, but it is a quite delicate issue and could end up changing the status quo by coercion. The forcible exercise of justice also needs legitimacy and consensus granted fully by the free and open international community. The U.S. has to exert its initiative to make a consensus with like-minded countries by sufficiently taking advantage of foreign relations and international organizations.
The core factor of “the New Cold War” between the U.S. and China is the rivalry and competition concerning mutual orders and powers, those of which are, for example, locking out Chinese companies of the U.S. supply chains, limiting access to technological information and research institutions, and enacting domestic laws to secure human rights and freedom. It is, however, unrealistic and undesirable to keep China's power apart from entire industries while we need to deescalate it in various industries. Besides, the U.S. government has adopted many of current policies of prohibition of transactions and refusal of foreign workers and students at a vague standard of the U.S. security concern, which are difficult for other countries to understand and accept.
Considering the fact that competition between the two powers will have been witnessed in various areas for a long time, it would be vital to share such clearer and acceptable guidelines with the international community as strictly controlling and operating both the utmost hard power, military power, and the technological information and resources directly linked to it.
Conclusion
The competition concerning orders and powers between the U.S.-China “New Cold War” has been analyzed above mainly referred to the military powers. Japan has secured the national security based on alliance with the like-minded U.S. while it has maintained significant economic partnership with China with a concept of Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests. The third largest economic country next to the superpowers could be involved in choice of associate. In so doing, a basic national posture should be firmly maintained, namely respecting both the free and open multilateralism and the existing orders. As the rivalry would be the long-term and many-sided one, Japan should avoid haphazard responses to each event, which would likely cause mistrust and damage the relationships with both the U.S. and China.
The COVID-19 spreading accidentally over the world has highlighted the difficulties for Japan to fully protect people's lives and livelihood only depending upon the Japan-U.S. alliance. It is fundamental to build up the independent national defense and resilience to safeguard Japanese society from pandemic as well as geo-economical threats with economic enforcement, cyberattacks and hostile influences.
Japan is a leader, who has contributed to maintaining and developing orders and regions such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). But the orders cannot survive without being backed by power to punish rogue regimes. Japan has to play a significant role in defending Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands against China, that is to say, keeping the international orders, and has no other choice, if not easy, but to enhance the national power sufficient for the role amid the pandemic.
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1 Mark Esper, “The Pentagon Is Prepared for China.” The Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2020.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-pentagon-is-prepared-for-china-11598308940
2 Ibid
3 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the U.S. of America
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 26, 2013”
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t1035948.htm
4 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2009
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-press-statement-president-obama-and-president-hu-china
5 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the U.S. of America”, December 2017
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
6 The U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p.4
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf
7 Geoff Wade, “China's six wars in the next 50 years,” The Strategist, November 26, 2013
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-six-wars-in-the-next-50-years/
8 The U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p.5
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf
9 Ibid, p.8
10 Michael R. Pompeo and Mark T. Esper, “South Korea Is an Ally, Not a Dependent,” The Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2020.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-is-an-ally-not-a-dependent-11579219989
11 DOD NEWS, “National Defense Strategy a ‘Good Fit for Our Times,' Mattis Says,” the U.S. Department of Defense, January 19, 2018.
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1419671/national-defense-strategy-a-good-fit-for-our-times-mattis-says/
12 Thomas G. Mahnken, Travis Sharp, Grace B. Kim, "DETERRENCE BY DETECTION: A KEY ROLE FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, p.iii
https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8209_(Deterrence_by_Detection_Report)_FINAL.pdf
1 Mark Esper, “The Pentagon Is Prepared for China.” The Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2020.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-pentagon-is-prepared-for-china-11598308940
2 Ibid
3 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the U.S. of America
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 26, 2013”
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t1035948.htm
4 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2009
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-press-statement-president-obama-and-president-hu-china
5 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the U.S. of America”, December 2017
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
6 The U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p.4
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf
7 Geoff Wade, “China's six wars in the next 50 years,” The Strategist, November 26, 2013
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-six-wars-in-the-next-50-years/
8 The U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,” p.5
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf
9 Ibid, p.8
10 Michael R. Pompeo and Mark T. Esper, “South Korea Is an Ally, Not a Dependent,” The Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2020.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-is-an-ally-not-a-dependent-11579219989
11 DOD NEWS, “National Defense Strategy a ‘Good Fit for Our Times,' Mattis Says,” the U.S. Department of Defense, January 19, 2018.
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1419671/national-defense-strategy-a-good-fit-for-our-times-mattis-says/
12 Thomas G. Mahnken, Travis Sharp, Grace B. Kim, "DETERRENCE BY DETECTION: A KEY ROLE FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, p.iii
https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8209_(Deterrence_by_Detection_Report)_FINAL.pdf