Taiwan in Tokyo's Growing Security Outlook
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Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator East Asia Centre The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi Dr. Jagannath Panda
Tokyo has always maintained a low-profile to engage with Taiwan post the 1972 Joint Communique1 between Japan and China. Politicians and policy-makers in Japan, across the political parties, have preferred to accord priority to their engagement with Beijing intending to normalize relations with China, rather than backing Taiwan's cause in a contested East Asian environment. The official level of engagement has been kept to a very minimum, trying to offer an impression to Beijing that Japan's engagement with Taiwan is non-official and much more commercial oriented. Such a standpoint from Japan has witnessed a subtle change, while Japan-Taiwan engagement is witnessing new momentum of engagement amidst Tokyo's changing security priorities and evolving outlook towards Taiwan itself.
In recent times, with Chinese belligerence towards Japan in the East China Sea and against Taiwan through maritime and air incursions, the Tokyo-Taipei dynamic has received a renewed impetus. In September 2020, reports emerged that Japan's new Prime Minister, Yoshihide Suga, may converse with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen over the phone, marking the first leader-to-leader exchange and ending the decades of diplomatic silence between them2. While Tsai quickly clarified that they had no immediate plans to do so, Suga's interest was nonetheless indicative of a growing interest in initiating a dialogue with Taipei in Tokyo.
On Taipei's part too, there has been increased interest in enhancing its regional and global connect with states that could possibly provide diplomatic or economic-political backing in a situation of emergency, should the People's Liberation Army (PLA) take bold strides to occupy Taiwan. In fact, in the face of an “intensifying military threat” from China and the “real possibility of a war”, the Taiwanese foreign minister, Joseph Wu, recently called for the formation of a ‘global coalition' to help defend its territorial integrity3. With the US President Joe Biden confirming his government's continued support to Taiwan vis-à-vis China, there is a possibility that Taiwan could become a part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue's (Quad 2.0) core focus, perhaps within a framework of ‘Quad plus Taiwan' construct. On January 24, 2021, in response to repeated Chinese incursions into the Taiwanese airspace over the weekend, Washington issued a stern warning4 affirming its “rock-solid5” support and sent6 its own carrier to the South China Sea. The incident, and the US' response shows the importance of Taiwan in the new emerging security dynamics of the region – opening the prospects of a closer Tokyo-Taipei relationship.
Japan, Taiwan and the “One China” Policy
While the China factor can push Japan and Taiwan ties further, it also remains a key denominator hindering the bilateral synergy between them. With Japan-Taiwan ties being seen as a “strong but constrained7” due to Tokyo-Beijing ties, China naturally occupies a central place in their relations. China's diplomatic pressure on Taiwan has led to states officially recognizing Taiwan as a state or an independent actor under the “One China” policy to fall8 from 22 to 15 since 2016.
Japan's adherence to the “One China” policy since 1972 – and by extension, its comprehension that Taiwan is an “inalienable9” part of the People's Republic of China (PRC) – has limited the relations between Tokyo and Taipei to quasi-diplomatic or quasi-official ties. In order to refrain from violating the “One China” principle, Tokyo-Taipei ties remain largely based on a non-governmental and working-level premise, with an overture to strengthen security understanding, which is fast emerging.
This arrangement has limited robust and steady Japan-Taiwan ties, for instance, by stopping Japan from sending a diplomatic envoy to Taiwan. Instead, the Interchange Association (IA) acts as a de-facto Japanese embassy and the Association of East Asian Relations (AEAR) as the Taiwanese embassy in Japan. However, these bodies were renamed the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association (JTEA) and the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association (TJRA) respectively in 2017, in an attempt to counter China's efforts to promote the use of “Chinese Taipei” over “Taiwan” in international community.
The rechristening of the IA and AEAR is symbolic of slowly, but gradually prospering relations between Tokyo and Taipei. Trade has always been a key pillar for cooperation, with two-way streams of capital, technology and people-to-people ties. Mechanisms such as the Taiwan-Japan Economic and Trade Conference, launched in 1975, have helped promote commercial ties; Japan is Taiwan's third-largest trading partner, while Taiwan ranks fourth amongst Japan's top economic partners with bilateral trade worth USD 67.3 billion in 201910. Japan is also Taiwan's fourth-largest investor11, with a total investment of USD 22 billion. Located in close proximity to each other, Taiwan and Japan share strong tourism links. Since their open skies agreement12 in 2011 that liberalized business avionics, there has been an increase in the number of flights between them13, leading to a record-high 2 million Japanese tourists visiting Taiwan in 201914.
Clashing Claims in the East China Sea (ECS)
Apart from the China factor, Taiwan and Japan (alongside China) also have overlapping claims on the disputed islands in the ECS; while Taiwan recognizes the islands as Diaoyutai, Japan calls them the Senkaku Islands15. Although the conflict is generally looked through a China-Japan prism, Taiwan has persistently reasserted its claims as part of a calculated strategy to be recognized as a claimant party to the dispute. For instance, when a municipal assembly in Japan's Ishigaki city sanctioned the renaming of the administrative district covering Senkaku Islands, Taiwan was quick to register its protest, urging Tokyo to “exercise self-restraint16” and not undermine bilateral ties. Additionally, Taiwan-Japan ties have also stressed over the Japanese 400,000-square-kilometer selective financial zone (EEZ) around Okinotorishima that Taiwan seeks access to17, Taipei's ban18 on Japanese food produced near Japanese radiation zones and its anticipation of an apology and compensation19 from Tokyo over their unresolved ‘comfort women20' colonial legacy.
However, the Japan-Taiwan maritime dialogue, introduced in 2016, has enabled active bilateral discussions providing scope for de-escalation of potential tensions21. Moreover, as Japan faces an increasingly belligerent China in the ECS, it may look for a quid pro quo scenario with Taiwan in which it recognizes Taipei as an independent entity and Taiwan reciprocates by acceding that the Senkaku Islands fall under Japanese jurisdiction. Such a scenario seems ever-more realistic under the present climate. Taiwan's claims are largely based on identity politics and its discord with China rather than strategic or economic rationales. To some extent, it could therefore be willing to give up its claims in return for considerable political benefits vis-à-vis China. For Suga too, a softer Taiwan policy seems on the cards, as evidenced by his selection of Nobuo Kishi – a pro-Taiwan politician – as Minister of Defense. As Suga attempts to consolidate support amid falling approval ratings ahead of the 2021 Japanese general elections22, he may be pushed to rethink Japan's Taiwan outlook by the country's 300-member strong pro-Taiwan parliamentary group, the Defense Ministry and the Biden administration23.
A Quad Connect?
Taiwan was labeled an “extremely important partner24” in Japan's 2020 foreign policy report, indicating its position, particularly with regards to Tokyo's contentions with China. In this context, both can find new avenues of cooperation in the regional and global mechanisms. For instance, in addition to Japan's growing collaborations with the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence-sharing group, Taiwan's inclusion can be instrumental amid their China focus.
The Quad can also emerge as a platform where Taiwan can interact with Japan, Australia, India and the US as a critical maritime partner, if not as an equal partner25. Historically, there has been somewhat of an inversely proportionate relationship between Japan and the other Quad states' ties with China and with Taiwan. The strides in Tokyo-Taipei relations during Abe took place in the years when Tokyo's relationship with China was not in order26. Considering the Quad nation's worsening ties with Beijing now, a stronger Taiwan connection under Quad's auspices is a logical progression.
The Quad must gradually build a stronger consensus on Taiwan and help it garner increased recognition with the international community while having a blueprint on how to defend its security if such a situation arrives while the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) adventurism is continously rising. Through the frameworks like the US-Taiwan Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific27, introduced in 2019, the Quad can work jointly to integrate Taiwan regionally and enable its meaningful participation within multilateral forums. Although Japan and the Quad partners remain far removed from calling for Taiwanese statehood, they can coordinate to provide staunch support to Taiwan and contribute to defending its national interests. They can begin, for example, by promoting Taiwan's economic links in the region (which are currently exceedingly dependent on China) and building diplomatic synergy between their respective international policies and initiatives. However, for Japan, or indeed any of the Quad nations, to initiate overt official ties with Taiwan and recognize it as a separate state or an independent entity, they would need to reconsider their commitment to the “One China” policy. Until such a scenario becomes a possibility, Tokyo and the Quad must continue strengthening synergy with Taiwan in alternate domains.
Dr. Jagannath Panda is a Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. He is the Series Editor for “Routledge Studies on Think Asia”. Dr. Panda tweets at: @jppjagannath1
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1 “Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. September 29, 1972. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
2 JOHNSON, JESSE. “Suga may look to end decades of silence and hold talks with Taiwan's Tsai.” Japan Times. September 19, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/19/national/politics-diplomacy/yoshihide-suga-taiwan-tsai-ing-wen/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
3 Davidson, Helen. "Taiwan calls for global coalition against China's aggression as US official flies in." The Guardian. September 17, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/17/taiwan-calls-for-global-coalition-against-chinas-aggression-as-us-official-flies-in.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
4 Wong, Chun Han. "China Flies Warplanes Near Taiwan in Show of Force, Prompting U.S. Warning." The Wall Street Journal. January 24, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-flies-warplanes-near-taiwan-in-show-of-force-prompting-u-s-warning-11611513299. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
5 “US support for Taiwan ‘rock-solid' as China again sends warplanes.” Al Jazeera. January 24, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/24/us-support-for-taiwan-rock-solid-after-china-sends-warplanes. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
6 Johnson, Jesse. “U.S. sends carrier into South China Sea as Chinese bombers fly near Taiwan.” Japan Times. January 24, 2021. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/24/asia-pacific/us-south-china-sea-taiwan/（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
7 Hornung, Jeffrey W. “Strong but constrained Japan-Taiwan ties.” Brookings. March 13, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/strong-but-constrained-japan-taiwan-ties/（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
8 Martin, Xiaoxue. "TAIWAN'S COMPETITION FOR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION MAINLAND CHINA." Clingendael. September 30, 2020. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/taiwans-competition-diplomatic-recognition-mainland-china. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. op.cit.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
10 “Taiwan-Japan Economic Relations.” Ministry of Economic Affairs. May 15, 2020. https://www.trade.gov.tw/English/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=2910&pid=652139. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
11 Ibid.
12 “Recent Japan-Taiwan Relations and the Taiwan Situation.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. July 2013. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/taiwan/pdfs/japan-taiwan_relations.pdf.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
13 “Japan-Taiwan Air Services – Benefitting from Open Skies.” OAG. April 23, 2015. https://www.oag.com/blog/japan-taiwan-air-services-benefitting-open-skies.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
14 Everington, Keoni. “Taiwan welcomes record 2 million Japanese tourists in 2019.” Taiwan News. January 7, 2020. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3852065.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
15 Wang, Vincent Wei-Cheng. “Taiwan's Policy toward the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute and the Implications for the US.” The Association for Asian Studies. https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/taiwans-policy-toward-the-diaoyu-senkaku-islands-dispute-and-the-implications-for-the-us/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
16 “Japan city vows to rename disputed isles area, irking China, Taiwan.” Kyodo News. January 23, 2020. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/06/07f115f93923-japan-city-renames-disputed-isles-area-risking-taiwan-china-backlash.html. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
17 Tiezzi, Shannon. “Taiwan-Japan Fishing Dispute Heats Up.” The Diplomat. May 3, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/taiwan-japan-fishing-dispute-heats-up/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
18 Zhou, Laura. “Taiwan keeps ban on food from Japanese radiation zones.” South China Morning Post. December 16, 2016. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2055245/taiwan-keeps-ban-food-japanese-radiation-zones. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
19 Pollmann, Mina. “Will Taiwan's ‘Comfort Women' Get an Apology From Japan?” The Diplomat. March 4, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/will-taiwans-comfort-women-get-an-apology-from-japan/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
20 “Whose Comfort?” World Scientific. 2019. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789811206351_0001. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
21 “Japan, Taiwan to set up dialogue mechanism for maritime affairs.”Japan Times. May 23, 2016. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/23/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-taiwan-set-dialogue-mechanism-maritime-affairs/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
22 “Japan PM Suga's approval sinks further on Covid-19 pandemic response.” The Straits Times. January 18, 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-pm-sugas-approval-sinks-further-on-covid-19-pandemic-response. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
23 Sasaki, Fumiko. “THE NEW JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER'S POLICY ON CHINA AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR TAIWAN.” Taiwan Insight. September 28, 2020. https://taiwaninsight.org/2020/09/28/the-new-japanese-prime-ministers-policy-on-china-and-its-implication-for-taiwan/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
24 Miyasaka, Shotaro. “Taiwan is 'extremely' important, Japan's diplomatic guideline says.” Nikkei Asia. May 20, 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-is-extremely-important-Japan-s-diplomatic-guideline-says. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
25 Nagao, Satoru. “The Quad Must Strengthen and Support Taiwan.” Hudson Institute. August 2, 2020. https://www.hudson.org/research/16285-the-quad-must-strengthen-and-support-taiwan. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
26 “World leaders praise Japan PM Shinzo Abe's contributions to bilateral ties.” Business Standard. August 28, 2020. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/world-leaders-praise-japan-pm-shinzo-abe-s-contributions-to-bilateral-ties-120082801564_1.html.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
27 “The Inaugural Session of the U.S.-Taiwan Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific Region.” American Institute in Taiwan. September 12, 2019. https://www.ait.org.tw/the-inaugural-session-of-the-u-s-taiwan-consultations-on-democratic-governance-in-the-indo-pacific-region/. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
1 “Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. September 29, 1972. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
2 JOHNSON, JESSE. “Suga may look to end decades of silence and hold talks with Taiwan's Tsai.” Japan Times. September 19, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/19/national/politics-diplomacy/yoshihide-suga-taiwan-tsai-ing-wen/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
3 Davidson, Helen. "Taiwan calls for global coalition against China's aggression as US official flies in." The Guardian. September 17, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/17/taiwan-calls-for-global-coalition-against-chinas-aggression-as-us-official-flies-in.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
4 Wong, Chun Han. "China Flies Warplanes Near Taiwan in Show of Force, Prompting U.S. Warning." The Wall Street Journal. January 24, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-flies-warplanes-near-taiwan-in-show-of-force-prompting-u-s-warning-11611513299. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
5 “US support for Taiwan ‘rock-solid' as China again sends warplanes.” Al Jazeera. January 24, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/24/us-support-for-taiwan-rock-solid-after-china-sends-warplanes. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
6 Johnson, Jesse. “U.S. sends carrier into South China Sea as Chinese bombers fly near Taiwan.” Japan Times. January 24, 2021. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/24/asia-pacific/us-south-china-sea-taiwan/（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
7 Hornung, Jeffrey W. “Strong but constrained Japan-Taiwan ties.” Brookings. March 13, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/strong-but-constrained-japan-taiwan-ties/（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
8 Martin, Xiaoxue. "TAIWAN'S COMPETITION FOR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION MAINLAND CHINA." Clingendael. September 30, 2020. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/taiwans-competition-diplomatic-recognition-mainland-china. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. op.cit.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
10 “Taiwan-Japan Economic Relations.” Ministry of Economic Affairs. May 15, 2020. https://www.trade.gov.tw/English/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=2910&pid=652139. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
11 Ibid.
12 “Recent Japan-Taiwan Relations and the Taiwan Situation.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. July 2013. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/taiwan/pdfs/japan-taiwan_relations.pdf.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
13 “Japan-Taiwan Air Services – Benefitting from Open Skies.” OAG. April 23, 2015. https://www.oag.com/blog/japan-taiwan-air-services-benefitting-open-skies.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
14 Everington, Keoni. “Taiwan welcomes record 2 million Japanese tourists in 2019.” Taiwan News. January 7, 2020. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3852065.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
15 Wang, Vincent Wei-Cheng. “Taiwan's Policy toward the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute and the Implications for the US.” The Association for Asian Studies. https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/taiwans-policy-toward-the-diaoyu-senkaku-islands-dispute-and-the-implications-for-the-us/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
16 “Japan city vows to rename disputed isles area, irking China, Taiwan.” Kyodo News. January 23, 2020. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/06/07f115f93923-japan-city-renames-disputed-isles-area-risking-taiwan-china-backlash.html. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
17 Tiezzi, Shannon. “Taiwan-Japan Fishing Dispute Heats Up.” The Diplomat. May 3, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/taiwan-japan-fishing-dispute-heats-up/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
18 Zhou, Laura. “Taiwan keeps ban on food from Japanese radiation zones.” South China Morning Post. December 16, 2016. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2055245/taiwan-keeps-ban-food-japanese-radiation-zones. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
19 Pollmann, Mina. “Will Taiwan's ‘Comfort Women' Get an Apology From Japan?” The Diplomat. March 4, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/will-taiwans-comfort-women-get-an-apology-from-japan/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
20 “Whose Comfort?” World Scientific. 2019. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789811206351_0001. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
21 “Japan, Taiwan to set up dialogue mechanism for maritime affairs.”Japan Times. May 23, 2016. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/23/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-taiwan-set-dialogue-mechanism-maritime-affairs/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
22 “Japan PM Suga's approval sinks further on Covid-19 pandemic response.” The Straits Times. January 18, 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-pm-sugas-approval-sinks-further-on-covid-19-pandemic-response. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
23 Sasaki, Fumiko. “THE NEW JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER'S POLICY ON CHINA AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR TAIWAN.” Taiwan Insight. September 28, 2020. https://taiwaninsight.org/2020/09/28/the-new-japanese-prime-ministers-policy-on-china-and-its-implication-for-taiwan/.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
24 Miyasaka, Shotaro. “Taiwan is 'extremely' important, Japan's diplomatic guideline says.” Nikkei Asia. May 20, 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-is-extremely-important-Japan-s-diplomatic-guideline-says. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
25 Nagao, Satoru. “The Quad Must Strengthen and Support Taiwan.” Hudson Institute. August 2, 2020. https://www.hudson.org/research/16285-the-quad-must-strengthen-and-support-taiwan. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
26 “World leaders praise Japan PM Shinzo Abe's contributions to bilateral ties.” Business Standard. August 28, 2020. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/world-leaders-praise-japan-pm-shinzo-abe-s-contributions-to-bilateral-ties-120082801564_1.html.（January 29, 2021 retrieved）.
27 “The Inaugural Session of the U.S.-Taiwan Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific Region.” American Institute in Taiwan. September 12, 2019. https://www.ait.org.tw/the-inaugural-session-of-the-u-s-taiwan-consultations-on-democratic-governance-in-the-indo-pacific-region/. （January 29, 2021 retrieved）.