Leakage of Dual-Use Technology via Japanese Academia
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Member of Policy Proposal Committee of JFSS Koji Hirai
Introduction
The Western countries increase their degree of warning against China's civil-military integrations policies that allow improving the capabilities of weapons through the conversion of imported and transferred sensitive technologies. Starting from 2020, the U.S. authorities have been concerned about the “China's Thousand Talents Plan” that American scientists participated in and transferred to China sensitive technologies, and have imposed severer visa examinations on Chinese students, and the U.K. also ordered strict visa restrictions on them.
Under the circumstances, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, in September 2020, refused to appoint, as members of the Science Council of Japan (SCJ), 6 of 105 candidates who were recommended by SCJ. Some of Japanese media and the opposition parties criticized the government, asserting that Suga's refusal invaded the academic freedom. At the same time, SCJ, which was unnoticed so far, has been brought to the public attention by this argument.
Therefore, two facts have been unveiled: SCJ, in March 2017, issued “Statement on Research for Military Security,” which confirms the 1967 statement that adopts “a statement on its commitment to never become engaged in scientific research for war purposes,1” and a double-standard that Japanese universities and research institutions should not be engaged in improving Japan's defense technologies, has been revealed and criticized by the public. As I mentioned as below, this is because Japanese academia has accepted Chinese students and researched dual-use technologies.
So, I want to discuss that Japanese academia has become a loophole, which allows the Western sensitive and dual-use technologies to be transferred and leaked to China, in the light of collaboration between Japanese national and private universities and the seven military-affiliated universities in China, and their acceptance of Chinese students.
Chinese Universities in Civil-Military Integrations Policies
Chinese universities are quite different from those of Japan. While no Japanese university plays a significant role in achieving modernizations of weapons of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), some Chinese universities do so: the seven military-affiliated universities and co-construction universities.
The background in which China established these military-affiliated universities is below. As characteristics of warfare have been changed, the means and fields of warfare are also being transmuted, such as AI, high-speed communication and wars battled in space (“intelligentized''
warfare). The National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan also expressed its concern over China's “intelligentized” warfare in 20202. The modernizations of weapons are required to achieve its national ambition, called “Chinese Dream,” to change the status quo of the global orders by coercion. Since results of “intelligenized” warfare depends on the general national scientific technologies, China has been stealing the Western dual-use technologies by many means, one of which is called the “Thousand Talents Plan” to attract high-level scientists from overseas providing huge salaries.
The Plan is established to transfer sensitive technologies to China as well. Chinese students, called “Haigui” meaning “sea turtle,” come to Japan to study Japanese dual-use technologies. Naturally, Chinese universities play a significant role in researching and developing weapons, as technologies studied there include something that can be converted to weapons of mass destruction (MDWs). We have to pay special attention to the difference between Japanese and Chinese universities.
How are Chinese universities managed in the arms industry? The State Council of the People's Republic of China has an agency, called the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND). SASTIND governs three groups that are composed of the seven military-affiliated universities, 16 co-construction universities and 26 within the local governments' jurisdiction.
SASTIND, which belongs to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, directly manage the seven military-affiliates universities: Beihang University, Harbin Institute of Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing University of Science and Technology and Northwestern Polytechnical University (see figure 1). The seven military-affiliates universities have been given “the qualification for equipment manufacturing units” and “the first grade of the confidentiality qualification in scientific research and production units of weapons and equipment,” which allow making a contract for military development of sensitive weapons and equipment directly with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Owing to the qualifications, the universities have been connected deeply with Chinese arms industry and the PLA.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education directly controls and SASTIND also manages 16 co- construction universities or quasi-seven military-affiliated universities: Peking University, Tsinghua University, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Tianjin University, Jilin University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Southeast University, Zhejiang University, Shandong University, Wuhan University, Huazhong University Of Science And Technology, Wuhan University Of Technology, Hunan University, Sichuan University, University of Electronic Science And Technology of China and Xidian University. In addition, there are 26 co- construction universities managed by the local governments.
For example, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Beihang University had a central role in developing military drones, which have been deployed to the PLA. This type of drones is designed to kill people as unmanned combat air vehicles, while imagined as a kind of toy aircraft in Japan. It is reported that Northwestern Polytechnical University provided the PLA with over 1,500 drones. In December 2019, Aero Engine Corporation of China announced that the corporation had signed the strategic cooperation agreement with Peking University. According to the agreement, they jointly proceed with technically strengthening engines for aircrafts such as fighter and bomber in the fields of AI, intelligent control and new materials which the University is good at.
Moreover, in January 2020, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) purchased a high-tech company, Tsinghua Tongfang founded by Tsinghua University. CNNC is engaged in nuclear products for civilian use, nuclear weapons and business of nuclear reactor for atomic-powered submarines. These examples show that Chinese universities play a significant role in arms industry in the country.
Countermeasures by the U.S. and U.K.
The U.S. has already adopted some countermeasures against outflow of its dual-use technologies to the seven military-affiliated universities. In May 2020, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added to the Entity List (EL) 24 Chinese state-owned groups and companies, including Harbin Institute of Technology and Harbin Engineering University. As a result, the two universities can't use “MATLAB,” an American software developed by MathWorks, as the addition of the universities to the EL stopped providing the licenses for the software.
If the U.S. government tightens bans on Chinese companies and universities and suspends U.S. licenses for, such as “AutoCAD” for architects and machinery designers, a machinery analysis software, “Adams” and “CarSim” for a simulation software of vehicles, they will struggle severe consequent damages.
In May 2020, The New York Times reported that “the Trump administration plans to cancel the visas of thousands of Chinese graduate students and researchers in the United States3,” aiming to protect the theft of intellectual properties by students and researchers who have ties to universities affiliated with the PLA, and that “the visa cancellation could affect at least 3,000 students, according to some official estimates. That is a tiny percentage of the approximately 360,000 Chinese students in the United States4.” This policy makes Chinese students studying in the U.S. be expelled and studying in other countries not come back to the U.S.
The Reuters put an article dated October 1, 2020, on its website, saying “Britain is to tighten rules about which subjects foreign students can study at its universities in a move to prevent the theft of intellectual property by Chinese students, the Times newspaper reported on Thursday.5” The government has further expanded the range of examination for overseas students to 44 subjects related to national security including space aeronautics, AI, cyber security, (atomic) physics and computer science. The students wanting to study these subjects in the U.K., will be rejected to apply for visa.
Japanese Universities and Seven Military-Affiliated Universities
Japanese universities and research institutions also study and research dual-use technologies, but they are not so wary about the possibilities that the technologies studied jointly with Chinese universities could be transferred and converted to China's weapons and equipment threatening Japan's security.
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI) has issued the list called “End User List,” which provides information on foreign companies and organizations for concern that they are involved with activities such as development of MDWs. The export with and technological disclosure to foreign entities in the List (except for case of not relating to MDWs) are required to get the permission of the Minister of METI. The End User List has registered Harbin Institute of Technology and Northwestern Polytechnical University. Table 1 shows the relations between Japanese universities and the seven military-affiliated universities.
Table 1: Relations between Japanese Universities and Seven Military-Affiliated Universities
(Edited by the author based on Inter-university exchange agreements with overseas universities
and Survey results on overseas locations (updated on April 30, 2020))
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. December 28, 2020.
https://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/koutou/shitu/1287263.htm（January 26, 2021 retrieved）.
Takashi Nakao, a Member of the House of Representatives and the Liberal Democratic Party, revealed that, in 2017, 80 Japanese students went abroad to the seven military-affiliated universities, while 172 Chinese students from those universities to Japan, 75 of those students belonged to Harbin Institute of Technology listed in the End User List, and accounted for over 40% of students in the seven military-affiliated universities6. The number of Japanese universities receiving Chinese students is in the double digits, with private universities in the Kanto region and national universities in the Chubu and Kyusyu regions. Some Japanese universities received 27 students from Beihang University relating to an activity of developing missiles. In addition, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) stated, in its report “The China Defence Universities Tracker,” that “between 2007 and 2017, the PLA sent more than 2,500 of its scientists to train and work in overseas universities. Some of those scientists used civilian cover or other forms of deception to travel abroad7.”
In fact, it is reported that Chinese students studying in universities and graduate schools of the U.S., arrested for covering their relations with the PLA. Therefore, we can't eliminate the possibility that some of Chinese military persons have infiltrated universities and research institutions to steal dual-use technologies with hiding their ties to the PLA.
We can assume that students in the seven military-affiliated universities which are banned to use American software, come to Japanese universities available for the software, and that those universities have the intention to utilizing Japanese facilities to study dual-use technologies of Japan. Although academic collaborations often involve universities and researches, participations of the seven military-affiliated universities, which have direct ties to military development, would be security concern.
The collaborations with the seven military-affiliated universities are highly likely to result in not only the threats to Japan's security, but also the distrust of the U.S. due to the conversion of our dual-use technologies into China's military programs.
Technological Managements based Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act and Higher Educational Institutions of Japan
Universities and research institutions are engaged in development of advanced technologies and overseas interactions. It is a national responsibility to keep such technologies from being converted into MDWs and terrorism, and being used for military expansion of states concerned. This is not limited to legal compliance alone, such as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. Especially, it is also required to establish the strict management and measures of collaborative research with the seven military-affiliated universities.
The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, in Article 258, requires Japanese companies, universities and research institutions to establish the export management system:① a resident must get the permission of the Minister of METI for a transaction with the objective of providing a non-resident with specified technology, and ② a resident or a non-resident must get the permission of the Minister of METI for a transaction with the objective of providing specified technology in a foreign state. Moreover, a resident or a non-resident must get the permission of the Minister of METI for a transaction with the objective of providing specified technology and transmitting information about a piece of specified technology using telecommunications.
In 2015, the Unfair Competition Prevention Act was amended to tighten its restriction as much as those of other countries, while a guidebook on the protection of confidential information in universities also issued in 2016.
The Control of Sensitive Technologies for Security Export for Academic and Research Institutions of METI shows that no more than 45% of universities and research institutions have set up internal rules on the control of security export as of June, 2019. Seeing that the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act requires them institutions to export equipment and provide technologies in accordance with the Act, all the target universities and research institutions should establish the internal rules with the time deadline, and should follow further the Compliance Standards for Exporters and Persons Conducting Similar Transactions stipulated in the Act, in order not to violate the law unconsciously. Moreover, it is also crucial to explain about the Act and the Compliance Standards to all the persons concerned such as professors and students (see Picture 1).
Picture 1: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
“Leaflet on Control of Security Export ‘Professor! Just a minute!'”
https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/seminer/shiryo/setsumei_senseimatta_e.pdf（January 26, 2021 retrieved）.
Japanese universities and research institutions have become a huge loophole of information leakages, since their measures are much more insufficient than those of companies. If a corporate violates the Act, it is subject to a fine of not more than one billion yen, while a person is subject to a fine of not more than 30 million yen, imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
The U.S., the ally of Japan, has seriously tackled the academic leakage of dual-use technologies and arrested Chinese military persons impersonating students. Similarly, it is no wonder that Chinese military persons are infiltrating Japan's universities and research institutions and stealing the technologies. It is most important to take a thorough search and to charge them with the violation, if any.
Indirect Military Supports of SCJ
As was referred to earlier, SCJ issued “Statement on Research for Military Security.” In addition, SCJ also criticized “National Security Technology Research Promotion Fund,” which the Ministry of Defense of Japan has established in 2015 to aid research for dual-use technologies, saying the government too much interferes the Fund. In the same year, Takashi Onishi, the former President of SCJ, and Han Qide, the former President of the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST), signed a memorandum for the purpose of promoting cooperation between the two organizations9. What was the problem with this partnership?
Homare Endo, Director of the Global Research Institute on Chinese Issues (GRICI) explained as below. In 2013, CAST and the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreement to further deepen cooperation in terms of scientific technology service and cultivation of talents10.
Some of main CAE researchers also hold the post of the National Defense Academy of Engineering, and there are active interactions between the two organizations in human resources and academic information. SCJ's cooperation with CAST is equivalent to cooperating with CAE, and also is tantamount to cooperating with the National Defense Academy of Engineering set up in 2017 under the PLA Academy of Military Science.
We can find the following sentences in the PDF file in SCJ's website: Both Parties shall assist scholars nominated within the Memorandum of Understanding in arranging their research programme and local hospitality in the host institution as per their normal practice11. This means that SCJ and CAST are designed to mutually receive recommended researchers if required. Director of GRICI Endo pointed out as above.
Whereas it has issued the statement to never become engaged in improvement of Japan's defense technologies, SCJ has paid no attention to concerns over being indirectly involved with China's military modernization. These postures are contradictory. When it is found out that Japan's universities and research institutions are engaged in research of dual-use technologies with Chinese students from the seven military-affiliated universities, the government has to reorganize SCJ from an extraordinary organ of the Cabinet Office to a general incorporated association. In fact, some of Japanese researchers who are related to SCJ reportedly have participated in the Thousand Talents Plan.
The Mainichi Shimbun reported on April 25, 201912, that Toshitaka Kajino, a space and nuclear physicist and a member of SCJ, had been assigned as a special professor in Beihang University. He also joined the Thousand Talents Plan in 2016. Meanwhile, we can find pictures of Masao Doi, a professor in Beihang University since 2013, on the website of Beijing Representative Office of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science13. He was given the title of a professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo after retired and is listed on the membership list of SCJ14.
Conclusion
Chinese students from the seven military-affiliated universities research dual-use technologies in Japan's universities, and then after coming back to the country, they contribute to the conversion of Japan's technologies into the modernization of PLA's forces and weapons, which could pose the threats to the JSDF. For example, it is unacceptable that researchers in Japan's universities and research institutions are indirectly involved with research for the development of China's missiles targeted to Japan, whereas they are not engaged in the development of the Japan's missile defense systems against adversaries' missile attacks. Such antinational researches must be severely punished when the Japanese organizations receive military-related persons impersonating students.
Can the Japanese academia counter such arguments that they have made light of the rules on the control of security export by the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, have hesitated to directing universities and research institutions to comply with the rules both thoroughly and adequately, and have ignored the military conversion of dual-use technologies by Chinese students in the Japanese organizations? I think that they have not recognized and enough managed the risks of the conversion.
Japan established the Economy Section in the National Security Secretariat of the Cabinet Secretariat and have observed the transfer of dual-use technologies in cooperation with the Western countries under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. It is, however, up to the rules of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act and directions by universities and research institutions to admit the entrance of students even from the seven military-affiliated universities or the PLA. As a result, there is the possibility that the dual-use technologies can be converted into foreign military under current laws.
Members of the Diet must carry out searches on all the subjects and details of Japan's universities that 172 students from the seven military-affiliated universities studied, and conduct close scrutiny of whether or not the subjects are related to the dual-use technologies. And then, the Japanese government must substantially discuss the restrictions in terms of national security. It is also crucial to adopt precise countermeasures based on concrete cases.
In the revision of study abroad programs, Japan should take into consideration the National Intelligence Law of China enacted in 2018. The Article 7 of this Law states that any Chinese organizations or citizens shall support, assist and cooperate with the national intelligence work in accordance with the law, and keep confidential the secrecy of the national intelligence work they are aware of. The state shall protect any individuals or organizations that support, assist and cooperate with the national intelligence work.
Besides, as a member of the Western Bloc, Japan is required to establish some strict frameworks for preventing the military conversion by students from overseas. To this end, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology should cooperate with the Economy Section in the National Security Secretariat, the International Bureau in the Ministry of Finance, METI, the National Police Agency and the Public Security Bureaus of all the prefectural polices in Japan. This is an urgent task for Japan because the leakage can affect our national security as well as that of the Western countries.
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1 “Statement on Research for Military Security.” Science Council of Japan. March 24, 2017. http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/info/kohyo/pdf/kohyo-23-s243-en.pdf.（January 18, 2021 retrieved）.
2 “China Security Report 2021: China's Military Strategy in the New Era.” National Institute for Defense Studies. November 2020. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2021_A01.pdf. （January 18, 2021 retrieved）.
3 Wong, Edward., Barnes, Julian E. “U.S. to Expel Chinese Graduate Students With Ties to China's Military Schools.” The New York Times. May 28, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/china-hong-kong-trump-student-visas.html（January 19, 2021 retrieved）.
4 Ibid.
5 Shirbon, Estelle. “UK to exclude Chinese students from sensitive subjects – Times.” Reuters. October 1, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-china-students-idUSKBN26M5YY（January 22, 2021 retrieved）.
6 Takashi Nagao. “Diplomatic Policies of the Suga's New Administration.” October 16, 2020. Key Note Chat, JFSS http://www.jfss.gr.jp/key_note_chat/43（January 19, 2021 retrieved）.
7 Joske, Alex. “The China Defence Universities Tracker” Australian Strategic Policy Institute. November 25, 2019. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker（January 19, 2021 retrieved）.
8 “Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act” Japanese Law Translation Database System. March 19, 2018. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=3267&vm=&re=（January 20, 2021 retrieved）.
9 “Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between Science Council of Japan and China Association for Science and Technology.” Science Council of Japan. September 7, 2015. http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/int/workshop/signed-mou.pdf（January 21, 2021 retrieved）.
10 “CAE and CAST Signed Strategic Cooperation Agreement.” Chinese Academy of Engineering. April 25, 2013. http://en.cae.cn/en/Local%20Development/Activites%20with%20Special%20Areas/20130621/cae11824.html（January 21, 2021 retrieved）.
11 “Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between Science Council of Japan and China Association for Science and Technology.” op. cit.
12 “Part 4: Global Trends/4 Inviting Top Brains to China: The Reality of the ‘Thousand Talents Plan' Unbelievable Annual Salary Offer Without Term.” The Mainichi Shimbun. April 25, 2019. https://mainichi.jp/articles/20190425/ddm/016/040/025000c（January 25, 2021 retrieved）.
13 “Holding of the Network Salon for Japanese Researchers in China.” Beijing Representative Office of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. https://www.jsps.org.cn/jspsbj/site/newsinfo/hdjp_detail.jsp?pid=1332&ld=1563178068821&yu=J（January 25, 2021 retrieved）.
14 “List of the 22nd Affiliated Members of the Science Council of Japan.” Science Council of Japan. http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/scj/member/renkei2b.pdf（January 25, 2021 retrieved）.
1 “Statement on Research for Military Security.” Science Council of Japan. March 24, 2017. http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/info/kohyo/pdf/kohyo-23-s243-en.pdf.（January 18, 2021 retrieved）.
2 “China Security Report 2021: China's Military Strategy in the New Era.” National Institute for Defense Studies. November 2020. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2021_A01.pdf. （January 18, 2021 retrieved）.
3 Wong, Edward., Barnes, Julian E. “U.S. to Expel Chinese Graduate Students With Ties to China's Military Schools.” The New York Times. May 28, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/china-hong-kong-trump-student-visas.html（January 19, 2021 retrieved）.
4 Ibid.
5 Shirbon, Estelle. “UK to exclude Chinese students from sensitive subjects – Times.” Reuters. October 1, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-china-students-idUSKBN26M5YY（January 22, 2021 retrieved）.
6 Takashi Nagao. “Diplomatic Policies of the Suga's New Administration.” October 16, 2020. Key Note Chat, JFSS http://www.jfss.gr.jp/key_note_chat/43（January 19, 2021 retrieved）.
7 Joske, Alex. “The China Defence Universities Tracker” Australian Strategic Policy Institute. November 25, 2019. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/china-defence-universities-tracker（January 19, 2021 retrieved）.
8 “Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act” Japanese Law Translation Database System. March 19, 2018. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=3267&vm=&re=（January 20, 2021 retrieved）.
9 “Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between Science Council of Japan and China Association for Science and Technology.” Science Council of Japan. September 7, 2015. http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/int/workshop/signed-mou.pdf（January 21, 2021 retrieved）.
10 “CAE and CAST Signed Strategic Cooperation Agreement.” Chinese Academy of Engineering. April 25, 2013. http://en.cae.cn/en/Local%20Development/Activites%20with%20Special%20Areas/20130621/cae11824.html（January 21, 2021 retrieved）.
11 “Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between Science Council of Japan and China Association for Science and Technology.” op. cit.
12 “Part 4: Global Trends/4 Inviting Top Brains to China: The Reality of the ‘Thousand Talents Plan' Unbelievable Annual Salary Offer Without Term.” The Mainichi Shimbun. April 25, 2019. https://mainichi.jp/articles/20190425/ddm/016/040/025000c（January 25, 2021 retrieved）.
13 “Holding of the Network Salon for Japanese Researchers in China.” Beijing Representative Office of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. https://www.jsps.org.cn/jspsbj/site/newsinfo/hdjp_detail.jsp?pid=1332&ld=1563178068821&yu=J（January 25, 2021 retrieved）.
14 “List of the 22nd Affiliated Members of the Science Council of Japan.” Science Council of Japan. http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/scj/member/renkei2b.pdf（January 25, 2021 retrieved）.