The US' withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fall of the country to the Taliban in August last year had ripple effects all across the world; East Asia was no exception. The latest trends with regards to terrorism in and from Afghanistan primarily stem from this development in international affairs, and its consequences reveal the different approaches of regional actors to counterterrorism, but also the possibilities for counterterrorism to emerge as a medium of cooperation. In the globalized order of present, such inferences can be drawn from the South Asian landscape and implemented in the East Asian security architecture with a regionalized approach with actors like China, Japan, India and South Korea holding vital sway.
Asia's counter-terror outlook amidst China's domestic threat perception
The effects of 9/11 and the US' ‘War on terror' have been prominent in most countries of East Asia for some time, especially South Korea and Japan. As key US allies1, they have been on high alert for attacks within their borders. South Korea has defined their major terrorist threats to include radical Islamic threats and the North Korean state and the controversial ‘Anti-terrorism Act2' of 2016 was a response to these. The policy brings to light once again the ongoing dilemmas over counter-terrorism, with regards to protecting citizens from attacks without eroding civil liberties and human rights in the process.
Asia, despite its directional divisions, is an excessively connected and interdependent regional space. Tokyo recognises a high threat of terrorism directed against Japan3. Domestically, in recent history the most devastating attack in Japan was the release of sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, killing 12 and injuring thousands, perpetrated by the Aum Shinrikyo group, former leaders of which were later executed in 2018. From an international perspective, Afghanistan's internal security for instance bodes threats not just for the South Asian region but also Southeast, East and Northeast Asia. Such recognition was witnessed in Japan's September 2021 security warning4 to its citizens in six Southeast Asian countries, advising them to avoid religious facilities as Tokyo warned of a possible terror attack－much to the surprise of the six host nations themselves.
To Beijing, the fall of Kabul to the Taliban had a potentially monumental impact in China because of the border it shares with Afghanistan5. The instability in Afghanistan and the space the country provides for jihadist militant groups to grow and embolden increases the risk of ‘spill-over' into the Chinese territory of Xinjiang and thus concerns that Uighur Muslims will be exposed to radicalisation and terrorism were widespread in Beijing. Over time, the Chinese government has implemented an effective securitization of the Uighur ethnic minority which has been used to legitimise repressive policy measures in the name of extremism prevention. The return of Taliban 2.0 to Kabul threatens such securitization.
China's regime of surveillance, monitoring, ‘re-education camps' and the limiting of political and civil freedoms of Uighurs has been under the guise of their ‘preventative counter-terrorism' in Xinjiang6. The arbitrary detainment of over 1 million Uighurs has sparked international outrage over the perpetration of human rights abuses by the Chinese government7. Beijing's concerns for Islamic terrorism are also compounded by the fact that there has been an increase of attacks occurring within Pakistan; some of which has been directed towards Chinese nationals in projects within Pakistan8.
International synergy vis-à-vis counterterrorism across Northeast Asia
China may indeed continue to be targeted by Pakistani jihadist and insurgent groups, which will fuel China's desire to strengthen their counter-terrorist measures9. This is a concern for the international community and has been echoed by regional and international groups beyond the United Nations.
For instance, the India-US-Japan-Australia ‘Quad' security dialogue grouping in its September 2021 joint statement has sought to “deepen our counter-terrorism and humanitarian cooperation”, stemming from threat perception arising from Afghanistan. Similar focus by the Quad on North Korea, urging it to “refrain from provocations” and refrain from illegal activities, further links to the grouping's growing geographic focus and recognition of linkage of the Indo-Pacific with other regions of Asia. Counter-terrorism is hence emerging as a means of critical cooperation within the Asia, wherein East Asian states like Japan are leading the charge drawing on their international linkages to build broader synergy.
The Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has similarly focused resources on counter-terror operations, linking it to its Convention on Counter-Terrorism10 launched in 2007 as well as continuing support for the UN's counter-terrorism groups. Importantly, ASEAN is at present guided by the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism 2018-202511; scope for linking such synergy against terrorism with the Quad and ASEAN member and dialogue partners must be focused upon.
The centrality of ASEAN in Indo-Pacific affairs means that it is the driving force of regional cooperation with regards to defence cooperation, and efforts to counter-terrorism have been established. In 2010, ASEAN Experts' Working Groups12 recognised five non-traditional security matters to be addressed based on common threats to member states which featured counter-terrorism. In June 2021, the 15th ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting and the 8th ASEAN Plus Defence Ministers Meeting took place, during which member states brought terrorism into the discussion as a contributor to the current fracturing of regional peace and stability13. Defence Ministers expressed concerns regarding the developments of regional terrorism and called for the ADMM and ADMM+ to expand and deepen their cooperation with regards to counter-terrorism.
Security outlooks by Asian powers
Individually as well, Asian states are connecting domestic national security to regional terror threats at a faster rate than before. For example, Japan recognises al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to be its chief terrorist threat. Overall, while Japan's radicalisation of foreign fighters remains minimal, the country does continue to deal with incidents involving the Islamic State. In 2015, two Japanese nationals were executed by ISIS as retaliation for Japan's intention to donate 200 million dollars in non-military aid to countries fighting ISIS14. This was part of an act with ASEAN to donate large aid packages to countries dealing with extremist violence. Japan has chosen a mostly international approach to counter-terrorism by engaging in bilateral talks and using regional platforms such as the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue.
Similarly, South Korea's take on counter-terrorism has followed a legal approach, with the Act on Counter-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security15 that was passed in 2016－against heavy opposition and the usage of the longest filibuster in the history of South Korea－holding central focus in protecting the state against North Korean terror activities. For Seoul and Tokyo, the proliferation of attacks will be expected to increase as the impact of the US' withdrawal from Afghanistan, growing tensions in ties with China, North Korea's nuclearization and China-US tension rise. Hence, finding bilateral synergy with countries like India on counter-terror ventures for both Japan and South Korea could emerge as a potential avenue of success. Furthermore, considering both Seoul and Tokyo's largely similar anti-terror focus, it could provide the two countries to find a common area of collaboration that supports the destressing of their tense historic ties; here too, India emerges as a powerful tertiary power. Japan and India already have an established Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism16 , while India and Japan's Quad roles allow them further synergy with the group's counter-terror focus. Similarly, India and South Korea in 2019 inked a memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism17. Overall, an India-Japan-South Korea trilateral focused on counter-terrorism could be envisioned.
However, concerns over regional stability are dominated by the geo-strategic, economic and military challenge the rise of China presents18. Thus, counterterrorism has perhaps taken a back seat with regional actors, and cooperative responses will be limited in their resources and capabilities with priorities being elsewhere. There may be an opportunity for powers such as Japan and India to step up and provide leadership, especially with the US mainly pre-occupied with China. Counter-terrorism, as a medium of cooperation, may actually be able to improve regional and international relations by increasing trust and confidence between actors, especially with the inclusion of China.
*Dr. Jagannath Panda is a Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Dr. Panda is the Series Editor for “Routledge Studies on Think Asia”.
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