The U.S.-Japan-Taiwan Coordination: Lessons Learned from the Taiwan Crisis Simulation

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Special Advisor/Ex-director, the Office of japan Affairs, the US Department of State Kevin K. Maher

 First, let me thank the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies for hosting the fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Policy Simulation between July 13-14th this year in Tokyo. The simulation presented realistic scenarios involving an attempt by China to use intimidation and military force to take control of Taiwan. As in the previous three years, many lessons were learned with respect to political decisions the Government of Japan will need to make in response to a Taiwan Strait crisis.
 Many of these involved U.S. expectations of Japanese operational participation in a response to Chinese aggression,and the need for the USG and the GOJ to coordinate, make operational plans, equip, train and exercise for such operations, all well in advance of any actual crisis. Beyond the advanced coordination between the U.S. and Japan,a key lesson also was the need for similar coordination with Taiwan, by both the U.S. and Japan.
 Strong Message to China: “Neither Extortion nor Invasion of Taiwan will Succeed”
 Government-to-government operational defense coordination with Taiwan,by the U.S. and by Japan, obviously is a sensitive matter from the perspective of international politics. We need to walk a fine line to avoid provoking a conflict with China by blatantly challenging the long-standing one-China policy. But at the same time, we must make it clear to the Chinese governmen and to the Chinese Communist Party that both the U.S. and Japan are prepared and willing to contribute to Taiwanʼs defense in order to deter Chinese aggression, and if necessary to defeat any such aggression. The best way to prevent a military conflict over Taiwan is to make Chinese leadership understand that China will fail if it attacks Taiwan or tries to intimidate Taiwan into surrendering to Chinese control.
 The Taiwan Crisis Simulation addressed several specific areas of operations in which prior coordination will be essential. I will discuss a few of these to illustrate the political decisions which will be required, and to illustrate in simple terms how military operational coordination and networking will be needed.