The 2+2 Calculus: India and Japan in Indo-Pacific
.
Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator East Asia Centre The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi Dr. Jagannath Panda
Common security challenges have mostly united ‘like-minded' actors; the rising assertiveness of China has had this very impact on the diplomatic, economic and political partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Here, few alignments, such as the evolving and natural partnership of the Asian economies of India and Japan, have held much sway and traction. With bilateral relations free of historical baggage, shared ambitions, and a common threat-perception coupled with an economic dependency on China, New Delhi and Tokyo were enabled to maintain mutual understanding and respect in their relations. In this context, as an endorsement of their ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership1', the 2+2 ministerial dialogue mechanism between India and Japan has, since its inception in 2019, greatly shaped the strategic cooperation between the two countries.
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga's visit to India including the 2+2 dialogue has been postponed due to the pandemic; yet the political intent to continue and hold such dialogue and visits holds immense potential in ascertaining the future of India-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. What does the forthcoming India-Japan 2+2 mean for the Indo-Pacific Balance of Power, and how does it add to the India-Japan Partnership?
Multilateral forms of engagement – be it the Quad or trilaterals such as the India-Japan-Australia, Australia-Japan-France, US-Japan-Australia, and Japan-US-India – have swiftly begun shaping the alignment and security conditions of the region. The 2+2 ministerial dialogues, too, have become strategic modes of iterating bilateral focus and sending a message vis-à-vis regional power balancing. In fact, Japan has majorly drawn from the 2+2 model for years in its interactions with major powers like the US, Russia, and France. On the other hand, India's 2+2 engagements, while nascent, have grown and strengthened rather swiftly, highlighting the growing importance New Delhi is giving to – and being accorded – in the security debates. In this context, the India-Japan 2+2 dialogue has been playing a significant role, underscored by a defining partnership between both the countries and a personal camaraderie between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, becoming a major propellor behind the active establishment of the foreign and defense ministerial-level meetings.
In the purview of the present situation, while such a personal rapport is yet to develop between Suga and Modi, the upcoming state visit of the Japanese leader to India is set to provide considerable avenues for its inculcation. Notably, since the onset of the current Japanese administration, Suga has been known to be a ‘continuity' leader, which has enabled him to focus on the Indo-Pacific domain through his dedication to sustaining the momentum of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) comprising India, Australia, Japan, and the US2. Apart from hosting the second Quad ministerial in 2020 and actively participating in the grouping, Japan under Suga has concentrated on strengthening the bilateral ties between Tokyo and the Quad countries. In this regard, the India-Japan 2+2 will be accorded greater importance, while witnessing discussions over pressing developments of vaccine diplomacy, supply-chain restructuring as well as deliberations on meeting the ‘China threat'. Further, with both countries having long focused on forming a continental-connect with Africa, the 2+2 dialogue becomes an ideal avenue to refocus on India and Japan's partnership in the region as well as emphasize their growing synergy with France, which has come at an opportune time to build focus on the Indian Ocean and African littorals.
Moreover, as China ramps up its activities in the East and South China Seas while the continuing imposition of belligerent actions in its dealings with Taiwan – only recently, a ‘record' number of Chinese airplanes entered Taiwanese air space3 – Suga's focus on building better security partnerships is taking the center-stage. Here, the Japanese government is progressively looking towards India as a partner with which it shares essential values and can help pursue a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as China continues its assertive adventurisms across the Indo-Pacific4. The two countries have time and again declared their focus on endeavors to guarantee FOIP and a shared vision for a rules-based order in the region based on territorial integrity. Bilateral naval exercises like JIMEX – which held their fourth iteration in 20205 – as well as the signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) have only complimented towards a stronger Indo-Pacific narrative between both the countries6. Further, the developments support the Malabar naval exercise between the Quad countries and accentuate the logistics agreements both Tokyo and New Delhi bilaterally share with the US, Australia, and other individual partner-states.
The 2021 India-Japan 2+2 will also set the stage for discussions on major avenues that can chart the way forward of the bilateral ties. India needs refined weapons and innovation tech from Japan; more coordinated efforts and participation can demonstrate gains to both countries. India aims for US-2 Amphibious Aircraft from Japan and is prepared for 30% assembling in the country; however, the two sides need to reach a concrete understanding or agreement toward this goal. A major limitation here is that Japan has been constitutionally restricted in defence exchange due to its Article 97. Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan has been putting forth genuine attempts to emerge from its pacifist constitution and be a part of the global defence exchange. However, despite being the longest-serving Prime Minister, Abe was not successful in amending the constitution. Developmental Cooperation between the two sides remains two dimensional; domestically, infrastructure advancement in the locales like north-east India under synergy between AEP and EPQI has significantly progressed. Internationally, development associations with countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Africa have made third-country cooperation a major ambit, though only project-based.
More importantly, Tokyo sees the current “Make in India” as an opportunity and has shown a continuous positive inclination to be invested in the scheme8. As a result, it shouldn't be surprising if the Japanese defence industry takes advantage of the “Make in India” initiative and establishes manufacturing units in India. To this effect, the India-Japan 2+2 dialogue provides a platform for discussion and how to position India-Japan ties in a multipolar world structure. More importantly, such a 2+2 format challenges the unilateral and unipolar push of China and raises an environment of strategic trust between India and Japan to take forward their envisioned cooperation. Building confidence and having closer strategic dialogue is key to any envisioned plan, and the India-Japan 2+2 is undoubtedly a more robust step to actualize practical-based cooperation between India's Act East Policy (AEP) and Japan's free and open Indo-Pacific outlook. China's management should be a top priority in India-Japan ties. However, such management will be more practical and possible if both India and Japan continue to have a more concrete, economic-centric security partnership.
Dr. Jagannath Panda is a Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. He is the Series Editor for “Routledge Studies on Think Asia”. Dr. Panda tweets at: @jppjagannath1
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1 “Japan-India Relations.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. January 4, 2021. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html.（April 21, 2021 retrieved）.
2 Nakamaru, Ryotaro. “Suga becomes Japan PM, forms continuity Cabinet as Abe era ends.” Kyodo News. September 17, 2020. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/09/e728ad6b92a7-suga-to-take-office-as-japan-pm-amid-virus-economic-woes.html. （April 21, 2021 retrieved）.
3 “Taiwan: 'Record number' of China jets enter air zone.” BBC. April 13, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56728072. （April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
4 ANI. “India, Japan to hold 2+2 talks amid aggressive China in Indo-Pacific.” Business Standard. April 10, 2021. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/india-japan-to-hold-2-2-talks-amid-aggressive-china-in-indo-pacific-121041000192_1.html.（April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
5 “Bilateral Maritime Exercise Between Japan and India (JIMEX 20) to Commence off West Coast of India.” Indian Navy. https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/bilateral-maritime-exercise-between-japan-and-india-jimex-20-commence-west-coast-india.（April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
6 Laskar, Rezaul H. “India, Japan sign key pact for reciprocal provision of supplies, services between defence forces.” Hindustan Times. September 10, 2020. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/japan-s-pm-shinzo-abe-speaks-on-phone-with-narendra-modi-lists-elevation-of-global-partnership-between-the-two-countries-as-a-key-achievement/story-dgAYdfesU7Vtz2Miua6z7M.html.（April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
7 “Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution.” Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php. （April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
8 “Japan committed to supporting PM Modi's Make in India initiative: PM Shinzo Abe.” Hindustan Times. October 28, 2018. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/japan-committed-to-supporting-pm-modi-s-make-in-india-initiative-pm-shinzo-abe/story-Xrwugne3pETcHAsEvrpKUM.html.（April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
Common security challenges have mostly united ‘like-minded' actors; the rising assertiveness of China has had this very impact on the diplomatic, economic and political partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Here, few alignments, such as the evolving and natural partnership of the Asian economies of India and Japan, have held much sway and traction. With bilateral relations free of historical baggage, shared ambitions, and a common threat-perception coupled with an economic dependency on China, New Delhi and Tokyo were enabled to maintain mutual understanding and respect in their relations. In this context, as an endorsement of their ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership1', the 2+2 ministerial dialogue mechanism between India and Japan has, since its inception in 2019, greatly shaped the strategic cooperation between the two countries.
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga's visit to India including the 2+2 dialogue has been postponed due to the pandemic; yet the political intent to continue and hold such dialogue and visits holds immense potential in ascertaining the future of India-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. What does the forthcoming India-Japan 2+2 mean for the Indo-Pacific Balance of Power, and how does it add to the India-Japan Partnership?
Multilateral forms of engagement – be it the Quad or trilaterals such as the India-Japan-Australia, Australia-Japan-France, US-Japan-Australia, and Japan-US-India – have swiftly begun shaping the alignment and security conditions of the region. The 2+2 ministerial dialogues, too, have become strategic modes of iterating bilateral focus and sending a message vis-à-vis regional power balancing. In fact, Japan has majorly drawn from the 2+2 model for years in its interactions with major powers like the US, Russia, and France. On the other hand, India's 2+2 engagements, while nascent, have grown and strengthened rather swiftly, highlighting the growing importance New Delhi is giving to – and being accorded – in the security debates. In this context, the India-Japan 2+2 dialogue has been playing a significant role, underscored by a defining partnership between both the countries and a personal camaraderie between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, becoming a major propellor behind the active establishment of the foreign and defense ministerial-level meetings.
In the purview of the present situation, while such a personal rapport is yet to develop between Suga and Modi, the upcoming state visit of the Japanese leader to India is set to provide considerable avenues for its inculcation. Notably, since the onset of the current Japanese administration, Suga has been known to be a ‘continuity' leader, which has enabled him to focus on the Indo-Pacific domain through his dedication to sustaining the momentum of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) comprising India, Australia, Japan, and the US2. Apart from hosting the second Quad ministerial in 2020 and actively participating in the grouping, Japan under Suga has concentrated on strengthening the bilateral ties between Tokyo and the Quad countries. In this regard, the India-Japan 2+2 will be accorded greater importance, while witnessing discussions over pressing developments of vaccine diplomacy, supply-chain restructuring as well as deliberations on meeting the ‘China threat'. Further, with both countries having long focused on forming a continental-connect with Africa, the 2+2 dialogue becomes an ideal avenue to refocus on India and Japan's partnership in the region as well as emphasize their growing synergy with France, which has come at an opportune time to build focus on the Indian Ocean and African littorals.
Moreover, as China ramps up its activities in the East and South China Seas while the continuing imposition of belligerent actions in its dealings with Taiwan – only recently, a ‘record' number of Chinese airplanes entered Taiwanese air space3 – Suga's focus on building better security partnerships is taking the center-stage. Here, the Japanese government is progressively looking towards India as a partner with which it shares essential values and can help pursue a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as China continues its assertive adventurisms across the Indo-Pacific4. The two countries have time and again declared their focus on endeavors to guarantee FOIP and a shared vision for a rules-based order in the region based on territorial integrity. Bilateral naval exercises like JIMEX – which held their fourth iteration in 20205 – as well as the signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) have only complimented towards a stronger Indo-Pacific narrative between both the countries6. Further, the developments support the Malabar naval exercise between the Quad countries and accentuate the logistics agreements both Tokyo and New Delhi bilaterally share with the US, Australia, and other individual partner-states.
The 2021 India-Japan 2+2 will also set the stage for discussions on major avenues that can chart the way forward of the bilateral ties. India needs refined weapons and innovation tech from Japan; more coordinated efforts and participation can demonstrate gains to both countries. India aims for US-2 Amphibious Aircraft from Japan and is prepared for 30% assembling in the country; however, the two sides need to reach a concrete understanding or agreement toward this goal. A major limitation here is that Japan has been constitutionally restricted in defence exchange due to its Article 97. Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan has been putting forth genuine attempts to emerge from its pacifist constitution and be a part of the global defence exchange. However, despite being the longest-serving Prime Minister, Abe was not successful in amending the constitution. Developmental Cooperation between the two sides remains two dimensional; domestically, infrastructure advancement in the locales like north-east India under synergy between AEP and EPQI has significantly progressed. Internationally, development associations with countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Africa have made third-country cooperation a major ambit, though only project-based.
More importantly, Tokyo sees the current “Make in India” as an opportunity and has shown a continuous positive inclination to be invested in the scheme8. As a result, it shouldn't be surprising if the Japanese defence industry takes advantage of the “Make in India” initiative and establishes manufacturing units in India. To this effect, the India-Japan 2+2 dialogue provides a platform for discussion and how to position India-Japan ties in a multipolar world structure. More importantly, such a 2+2 format challenges the unilateral and unipolar push of China and raises an environment of strategic trust between India and Japan to take forward their envisioned cooperation. Building confidence and having closer strategic dialogue is key to any envisioned plan, and the India-Japan 2+2 is undoubtedly a more robust step to actualize practical-based cooperation between India's Act East Policy (AEP) and Japan's free and open Indo-Pacific outlook. China's management should be a top priority in India-Japan ties. However, such management will be more practical and possible if both India and Japan continue to have a more concrete, economic-centric security partnership.
1 “Japan-India Relations.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. January 4, 2021. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html.（April 21, 2021 retrieved）.
2 Nakamaru, Ryotaro. “Suga becomes Japan PM, forms continuity Cabinet as Abe era ends.” Kyodo News. September 17, 2020. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/09/e728ad6b92a7-suga-to-take-office-as-japan-pm-amid-virus-economic-woes.html. （April 21, 2021 retrieved）.
3 “Taiwan: 'Record number' of China jets enter air zone.” BBC. April 13, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56728072. （April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
4 ANI. “India, Japan to hold 2+2 talks amid aggressive China in Indo-Pacific.” Business Standard. April 10, 2021. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/india-japan-to-hold-2-2-talks-amid-aggressive-china-in-indo-pacific-121041000192_1.html.（April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
5 “Bilateral Maritime Exercise Between Japan and India (JIMEX 20) to Commence off West Coast of India.” Indian Navy. https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/bilateral-maritime-exercise-between-japan-and-india-jimex-20-commence-west-coast-india.（April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
6 Laskar, Rezaul H. “India, Japan sign key pact for reciprocal provision of supplies, services between defence forces.” Hindustan Times. September 10, 2020. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/japan-s-pm-shinzo-abe-speaks-on-phone-with-narendra-modi-lists-elevation-of-global-partnership-between-the-two-countries-as-a-key-achievement/story-dgAYdfesU7Vtz2Miua6z7M.html.（April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
7 “Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution.” Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php. （April 23, 2021 retrieved）.
8 “Japan committed to supporting PM Modi's Make in India initiative: PM Shinzo Abe.” Hindustan Times. October 28, 2018. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/japan-committed-to-supporting-pm-modi-s-make-in-india-initiative-pm-shinzo-abe/story-Xrwugne3pETcHAsEvrpKUM.html.（April 23, 2021 retrieved）.